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THE IMPACT OF LIQUIDITY PROVIDERS - EVIDENCE FROM HELSINKI ENHANCE 
AND STOCKHOLMSBÖRSEN
Objective of the study
This paper studies the impact of the Liquidity Providers on the market quality, trading, 
and share prices at Helsinki Exchange and Stockholmsbörsen. During the past few 
years or so these two exchanges have been offering listed companies a possibility to 
use Liquidity Provider services in share trading to increase their trading volumes and 
to improve the quality of trading. The research problem in this paper is whether the 
Liquidity Providers can contribute to the market quality and increase the liquidity of 
the constituent shares.
Data and Methodology
The data consists of daily trading and price information of 29 Finnish and 79 Swedish 
shares and related market indices, OMX Helsinki CAP Total Return Index and OMX 
Stockholm Benchmark Total Return Index. Data source is Thomson Datastream. The 
used event study methodology includes trading volume analysis, market depth 
analysis, market efficiency analysis and Cumulative Abnormal Return Analysis. The 
tests employed are common t-test and Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests.
References
References used in this study are academic articles and publications collected from 
various respected academic publications.
Results
The results are convincing. The analysis provides evidence that the liquidity providing 
system improves liquidity. Trading volumes increase in all samples together with 
deepening market depths. The improvement in liquidity is accompanied with 
enhancement in the market efficiency. The pre-even least liquid shares show strong 
positive abnormal returns which gives evidence of a liquidity premium. All in all, the 
liquidity providing system is capable of improving the market environment and 
increasing trading.
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The liquidity of securities, the relationship between volume of trading and changes in market 
price, has won increasing recognition as an element of investment strategy in recent years. 
Relatively high liquidity is deemed to be a desirable characteristic of a stock, especially for 
the institutional investor, who typically trades in large volume. Thus, firms can generally be 
expected to seek means of enhancing the liquidity of their shares. Satisfactory liquidity results 
in lower investment costs and, from the investors' viewpoint, simplifies the process of both 
buying and selling shares, thus reducing the risk. From the listed companies' viewpoint, 
liquidity is a key element in fair equity valuation. One of the supposed means of 
accomplishing this is using Liquidity Providers’ services.
In its own words, OMX focuses on continuously creating the best possible conditions for 
efficient trading. Accordingly, the Stockholm Stock Exchange and the Helsinki Stock 
Exchange have introduced Liquidity Providers for share trading to improve the quality of 
trading. This enhances the markets' liquidity and reduces costs for investors. Companies 
wishing to improve the liquidity of their shares can benefit from the services of Liquidity 
Providers.
According to the minimum requirements the liquidity providing (also referred to as “LP” 
hereafter) must quote prices in at least four trading lots, on both buy and sell sides so that the 
prices do not deviate more than 4% from each other, calculated on the bid price. The prices 
shall be quoted at least 85 % of the time of the continuous trading as well as in the applicable 
opening and closing auctions. I exploit this new opportunity to investigate the effect of the 
liquidity providing on minimum price variation on bid-ask spreads, trading volumes, and 
overall market quality1. In more general sense, this paper examines the effect of the LP on the 
Helsinki Stock Exchange and Stockholmsbörsen and evaluates the possible benefits that may 
arise with them.
The efficient market hypothesis assumes that there are no frictions in the market whatsoever 
and the share prices reflect the real values of the companies without any distortion (see e.g.
1 September 25, 2006 Helsinki Stock Exchange commenced trading with 1 share lots. The new rules require that 
a liquidity provider guarantees at least EUR 4 000.00 worth of both bid and ask side transactions.
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Fama et al. (1969)). Accordingly, a firm’s price in theory would be the summation of the 
future free cash flows discounted to the present time with the investors’ required return for the 
given level of risk. However, in the real world there are several other factors that play a role 
in the price discovery of any given company. Such factors are taxes, transaction costs, 
spreads, asymmetric information and liquidity to mention a few. In this study I will look into 
one of them - the effect of liquidity on share prices and market quality.
A very interesting question for both financial economists and investors is whether investments 
in improving the market microstructure have positive value. Ceteris paribus, improved 
liquidity is expected to increase securities values because rational investors discount securities 
more heavily in the presence of higher trading costs. This proposition by Amihud and 
Mendelson (1986) has been empirically supported in various studies. Cross-sectionally risk- 
adjusted returns on stocks and bonds were found to be increasing in their illiquidity, measured 
by their bid ask spread (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986, 1989a, 1991a; Kamara, 1994). 
Amihud, Mendelson and Wood ( 1990) found that during the stock market crash of October 
19th 1987, price declines were greater for stocks whose liquidity suffered most, and price 
recovery was greater for stocks whose liquidity subsequently improved. Further, there are 
many papers about market quality improvements due to market microstructure changes. 
Amihud et al. (1997) studied the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange where stock trading was 
transferred from daily auctions to a mechanism where the call auction was followed by 
iterated continuous auction. Pagano and Schwarz (2003) investigated the impact of closing 
calls on market quality at Euronext Paris. The results were in line with what was expected: as 
the trading became more straightforward, frictions diminished and the quality of the market 
improved.
Several indicators can be used to measure the liquidity of a company's shares. Three key 
measurements are turnover, order depth and the spread (the difference between bid and ask 
prices). The spread is significant to investors because it is an indirect transaction cost, the cost 
between buying and selling at any given time. The thinner the spread, the lower the 
transaction cost. Academic literature considers the spread to be a significant proxy for 
liquidity.
The research question is simple - has the liquidity providing system succeeded where it is 
supposed to, i.e. has it increased liquidity and improved market quality? If so, do the investors
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assign value to this hypothesized market quality improvement? According to the efficient 
market hypothesis, the price discovery should be efficient and accurate despite of any external 
systems. For the companies contracting Liquidity Providers or planning to do so in the future, 
the results of this study may provide very interesting and important information.
The main hypothesis in this paper is that the implementation of a LP system in the Helsinki 
and Stockholm Exchanges will improve market quality as a whole and accordingly, I expect 
results of increased trading volumes as well as improved quality of trading.
The methods employed are very similar to those in the earlier studies on microstructure 
changes of stock exchanges. I conduct tests to examine a possible increase in trading and 
market depth. I also conduct a test to study whether the market efficiency has improved. This 
should be the case as market frictions decline. Finally, I will conduct tests to examine the 
changes in share prices to find out if there is value in the improvements that Liquidity 
Providers bring to the market.
In the next section I go through some earlier research related to the liquidity and market 
microstructure changes and the used methodology. In the third section I introduce the data and 
its properties as well as the empirical methodology I will use to study the research problem. In 
addition, I will present the hypothesis in more detail. In the fourth chapter I will introduce the 
empirical evidence. The rest of this paper is will concentrate on the empirical results and the 
discussion around them.
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2. THEORY AND REVIEW OF EARLIER STUDIES
In this chapter I introduce the related academic literature. Liquidity is widely studied and the 
academic world holds quite a solid consensus on the subject. There are many research papers 
on market microstructure changes, which are theoretically very close to this study. This 
chapter lays the supporting theoretical framework which builds on those of earlier studies. 
The papers I introduce are in my opinion the most relevant for this study. Not surprisingly, 
many of them are papers that are frequently referred to in academic literature.
I introduce the prior work that is specifically related to my study starting with the papers 
concerning liquidity as a concept, followed by ones that are related to changes of market 
microstructure or of other aspects of the trading environment. After this I introduce papers 
concerning the effect of liquidity on market efficiency and discuss the event study 
methodology. This chapter concludes with analysis of the papers that have studied the same 
subject as this one.
2.1. Introduction to Liquidity
Liquidity is a complex concept. It is characterized by high turnover, or a high level of trading 
activity, in a company’s share. High turnover, and thereby liquidity, is the result of the 
combination of a small spread and a high order depth. The spread is the difference between 
the bid and ask price, and order depth is the total volume behind the bid and ask prices.
Many indicators are used to measure the liquidity of a company's shares in academic 
literature. Three key measurements are turnover, order depth and spread. The spread is 
significant to investors because it is an indirect transaction cost - the cost between buying and 
selling at any given time. The tighter the spread, the lower the transaction cost for the 
investor. The order depth in turn shows how many shares an investor can buy or sell at a 
given price. A high order depth minimizes the risk for a negative price movement when 
buying or selling shares. A low spread and high order depth consequently mean lower costs 
for investors. Ceteris paribus, this combination lowers risk and makes a company's shares 
more attractive.
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The concept of liquidity would be best described as the ease of trading a security. There are 
many sources of illiquidity. One of them is the set of exogenous transaction costs such as 
brokerage fees, order-processing costs, or transaction taxes. These occur in every trade that 
takes place on the market. Thus, a rational investor accounts for these fees every time he or 
she acts as an agent on the market. Moreover, he also has to consider the future costs of the 
bought security as well, i.e. all the related costs upon the future sale. Intuitively that would 
mean, that any one investor on the market gives - what he thinks is a fair price for a security 
based on these costs - and risks. Thus, these costs are taken into consideration in the expected 
returns.
The more risks are involved with the share, the higher is the required return and the lower the 
investor’s fair price. If the price on the market is more than the deemed fair price, the investor 
is willing to sell and vice versa. The investor expects to achieve profits as compensation to the 
borne costs - the more there are costs, the higher is the expected profit and the lower the target 
share price. On the securities market, the previous sentence could be translated as the more 
there are costs and risks involved the less is an investor’s fair price he is willing to pay for a 
security which translates into a higher required return. Now, if the liquidity - or illiquidity - 
appears as a risk or a cost for instance in terms of a large spread, then an investor will 
discount the share prices more heavily, that is, at a higher required rate of return for his 
investment because of the illiquidity. This proposition was first introduced by Amihud et al. 
(1986), which I will introduce in more detail in the next chapter.
One important dimension of liquidity is the market depth of a security. Market depth is the 
size of an order needed to move the market a given amount. If the market is deep, a large 
order is needed to change the price. In the context of liquidity, it can broadly be said that 
market depth is the ease of find a trading partner for a given order. Retail investors play only a 
small role in the markets since they are usually far too small agents to have any real effect on 
the market and on prices. But there are several agents on the market that can easily affect the 
market which stems from their sheer volume. These institutional investors tend to favor liquid 
shares for various reasons. Both the nature and the extent of their supply and demand interact 
to reduce price movement relative to trading volume. It is quite clear that institutional 
investors have good reasons to consider liquidity in formulating their portfolio strategies and, 
as a matter of policy, to avoid illiquid stocks. The associated dampening effect on demand can 
only act to lower prices of illiquid securities. The degree to which this effect is operative may
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vary, however, with swings in the market. At the other end of the market depth spectrum fall 
closely held and/or very small firms - the securities of which are not favored by institutional 
investors. It has been suggested that institutional investors buy large capitalization stocks first 
as well as sell the small stocks first (see e.g. Vayanos and Vila (1999)). If so, major moves 
into and out of the equity markets by institutional investors may affect relatively illiquid 
securities differently than more liquid stocks. The effect, during a market upswing and heavy 
institutional buying, is suspected of causing price increases in less liquid securities to lag 
behind the general market movement. In contrast, during a market downswing and a general 
retreat of institutional investors from the equity market, price declines in less liquid securities 
might cause the overall market to dip.
One more problem with illiquid shares arises when there are no quotes on the market at all 
that is the case with many of the most illiquid shares in the Finnish and Swedish markets. 
Demand pressure arises because not all investors are present in the market at all times, which 
means that if an investor needs to sell a security quickly, then the natural buyers may not be 
immediately available. In the specialist market, as a result, the seller may sell to a market 
maker who buys in anticipation of being able to later lay off the position. The market maker, 
being exposed to the risk of price changes while he holds the asset in inventory must be 
compensated for this risk, i.e. inventory risk, - a compensation that imposes a cost on the 
seller. Therefore, when the payoff in the form of spreads is limited as it is with the Liquidity 
Providers, they have a natural need to closely monitor the companies they guarantee in order 
to keep their heads on the surface2.
The demand risk stemming from the abovementioned demand pressure also has another 
aspect. Let’s say that an investor has private information on the company and he is sure that 
the company’s shares are going to crash due to the prevailing market situation. Obviously, he 
would like to sell the shares, but if there are no buyers on the market he is not able to do so 
unless he lowers the price until someone is willing to buy. This is an example of the basic law 
of supply and demand. He could avoid the associated delay by promptly selling the asset at 
the quoted bid price, which reflects a liquidation discount. Similarly, to avoid delays, a buyer 
can choose to consummate an immediate purchase at the seller’s ask price, which is higher 
than the asset's current resale value. Thus, trading at the quoted bid and ask prices saves
2 The minimum requirements of Liquidity Providing demand that the bid-ask spread is under 4% calculated from 
the bid price.
12
traders the associated delays and difficulties — but at a cost. The liquidity of an asset may 
thus be measured by its bid-ask spread (the difference between the dealer's bid and ask 
quotes), which represents the price of liquidity (or immediacy) services (Amihud and 
Mendelson, 1989a)
Another issue that has been under study for several years now is asymmetric information and 
the cost of acquiring knowledge. The fair price discovery of any given share requires that all 
investors would have availability to the same information about a company at the same timely 
manner. However, this is not the case in the real world. In order to achieve knowledge, an 
investor has to buy it or work to get it. This information gathering process results among other 
things in costs that are subsequently reflected in the share prices.
Asymmetric information has also another and maybe more straightforward interpretation. 
That is the fact that, trading a security may be costly because the traders on the other side may 
have private information. For example, the buyer of a stock may worry that a potential seller 
has private information that the company is losing money, and vice versa that the seller may 
be afraid that the buyer has private information that the company’s share price is about to take 
off. Thus, trading with a better informed counterparty will end up with a loss. In addition to 
private information about the fundamentals of the security, agents can also have private 
information about order flow. For instance, if a trading desk knows that a hedge fund needs to 
liquidate a large position and that this liquidation will depress prices, then the trading desk 
can sell early at relatively high prices and buy back later at lower prices.
The earnings principle of Liquidity Providers drives Liquidity Providers to closely monitor 
the companies they guarantee. They are making money by buying low and selling high within 
the regulated 4% bid-ask spread limit. Therefore, it is in their best interest to know the fair 
price for the share and in their part diminish the problems arising from asymmetric 
information and promote the correct price discovery in the market. Most importantly they 
have the muscle to do so and may even have access to more accurate information about the 
companies they are guaranteeing than other parties. It is fair to assume that due to the 
presence of Liquidity Providers there is better and closer monitoring for a guaranteed 
company.
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All in all, liquidity has wide-ranging effects on financial markets. In their paper “Liquidity 
and Asset Prices”, 2005, Amihud et al. show theoretically and empirically that liquidity can 
explain the cross-section of assets with different liquidity, after controlling for other assets’ 
characteristics such as risk, and the time series relationship between liquidity and securities 
returns. They argue that liquidity helps explain why certain hard-to-trade securities are 
relatively cheap, the pricing of stocks and corporate bonds, the return on hedge funds, and the 
valuation of closed-end funds. It follows that liquidity can help explain a number of puzzles, 
such as why equities command high required returns (the equity premium puzzle), why liquid 
risk-free treasuries have low required returns (the risk-free rate puzzle), and why small stocks 
that are typically illiquid earn high returns (the small firm effect).
All of the costs of illiquidity mentioned above should affect security prices if and when 
investors require compensation for bearing them. In addition, because liquidity varies over 
time, risk-averse investors may require a compensation for being exposed to liquidity risk. 
These effects of liquidity on asset prices are important. Investors need to know them in 
designing their investment strategies. And if liquidity costs and risks affect the required return 
by investors, they affect corporations’ cost of capital and, hence, the allocation of the 
economy’s real resources.
The presence of the Liquidity Providers should at least in theory lower the cost stemming 
from the illiquidity. Above, I shared the common knowledge of the costs of illiquidity with 
the reader. The fact alone that illiquidity is considered as a cost is enough grounds to make an 
assumption that market players should put value on removing it. In addition, based on the fact 
that the spread is considered to be a major factor of liquidity, by artificially diminishing the 
spread, should have a positive effect on trading volumes.
Above, the characteristics of the liquidity are explained mainly from the investors’ point of 
view. However, the underlying companies also stand to gain. In the normal situation it is in 
any company’s best interest that it is correctly priced on the market. The correct market price 
provides shelter against hostile takeovers, enables fair priced financing and prevents some 
other problems concerning corporate governance and corporate finance. However, corporate 
finance theory is far beyond the scope of this study and thus I leave further association of the 
subject to other topics to readers’ interest.
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The literature on liquidity is vast. In this paper I will concentrate more on those concerning 
the effects of market microstructure changes of the market. Accordingly, the rest of this 
chapter concentrates on the academic literature and their findings on liquidity and especially 
the factors influencing it. Surveys of liquidity and market microstructure changes such as 
Amihud et al. (1997), Pagano and Schwartz (2003), Ahn et al. (1996) suggest that changes in 
an exchange’s microstructure can affect the market’s liquidity, trading costs, pricing 
efficiency, and transparency. This study is closely related to those earlier studies on exchange 
microstructure changes and reductions in the tick-sizes of foreign exchanges. Some studies 
have concentrated on more drastic changes in the market environment. E.g. Cooper et al. 
(1985) studied the liquidity and stock performance when shares start trading in a completely 
new market and which in turn increases their liquidity by way of greater exposure. However, I 
find it adequate to introduce maybe the most profound paper on the liquidity and bid-ask 
spread first and some papers that build on the theory introduced by it.
2.2. The Interaction between Liquidity and Share Returns
The most profound work done under the subject is the paper by Amihud and Mendelson, 
1986. Their paper studies the effect of securities’ bid-ask spreads on their returns. They model 
a market where rational traders differ in their expected holding periods and assets have 
different spreads. The ensuing equilibrium had the following characteristics: 1. market- 
observed average returns are an increasing function of the spread, 2. asset returns to their 
holders, net of trading costs, increase with the spread, 3. there is a clientele effect, whereby 
stocks with higher spreads are held by investors with longer holding periods, and 4. due to the 
clientele effect, returns on higher-spread stocks are less spread-sensitive giving rise to a 
concave return-spread relation.
In their study they design a test on the behavior of observed returns, and find results that 
support the theory. The robustness and statistical significance of their results are very 
encouraging. They argue that their results do not point at an anomaly or market inefficiency; 
but rather, reflect a rational response by investors in an efficient market when faced with 
trading friction and transaction costs.
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The higher yields required on higher-spread stocks give firms an incentive to increase the 
liquidity of their securities, thus reducing their opportunity cost of capital. Consequently, 
liquidity-increasing financial policies may increase the value of the firm. To illustrate this 
with figures consider for instance an asset yielding $1 per month with a 3.2% bid-ask spread 
and having a 2% opportunity cost of capital and value of $50. Their model estimates that if 
the spread is reduced from the mentioned 3.2% (their high spread group) to their low spread 
group’s 0,486% the asset value would increase in value about 50% to $75.8. That should 
provide enough motivation for any firm to invest in liquidity improvements.
In their study they also tested for the well recognized firm size effect on liquidity by building 
a model where the natural logarithm of firm size was added to their model, where other two 
factors, ß and spread, remained the same. Their results suggest that after the addition the ß 
and spread prevail, whereas the size-effect is insignificant. In sum, their results on the return- 
spread relation cannot be explained by a ‘size effect’ even if the latter exists. In fact, any ‘size 
effect’ may be a consequence of a spread effect, with firm size serving as a proxy for 
liquidity. And, rather than suggesting an ‘anomaly’ or an indication of market inefficiency, 
their return-spread relation represents a rational response by an efficient market to the 
existence of the spread.
The results presented above are in maybe the most referred paper studying the spreads, share 
performance and liquidity. But there is a vast group of papers that post very similar results. 
For instance, Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) investigate the empirical relation between 
monthly stock returns and measures of illiquidity obtained from intraday data. They find a 
significant relation between required rates of return and these measures after adjusting for the 
Fama and French risk factors, and also after accounting for the effects of the stock price level.
Their main findings are that there is a significant return premium associated with both the 
fixed and variable elements of the cost of transacting. The relation between the premium and 
variable cost is concave, which is consistent with clientele effects caused by small traders 
concentrating in less liquid stocks. However, the relation between the premium and the 
estimated fixed cost component is convex. This is inconsistent with the horizon clientele 
effect proposed by Amihud and Mendelson (1986), and in their opinion may be the result of 
their inability to estimate this parameter accurately on account of price discreteness. 
Alternatively, it may be due to incomplete risk adjustment by the three-factor Fama and
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French model they use. They also find that even after risk adjustment using this model there is 
an additional risk premium associated with an inverse price factor. There is no evidence of 
seasonality in the premiums associated with their cost of transacting variables. Finally, an 
interesting byproduct of their analysis is the finding that controlling for firm size, there 
appears to be a negative relation between the variable and fixed costs of transacting. They 
however, do not find an explanation but merely state that, “theoretical and empirical 
understanding of this phenomenon appears to be a fruitful area for future research”.
Amihud (2002) presents new tests of the proposition that asset expected returns are increasing 
in illiquidity. The study follows the (at that point) well known fact that illiquidity explains 
differences in expected returns across stocks. The new tests of the paper propose that over 
time, market-wide expected illiquidity affects the ex ante stock excess return. This would 
imply that the stock excess return usually referred to as the ‘risk premium’, also provides 
compensation for lower liquidity of stocks relative to that of Treasury securities. And, 
expected stock excess returns are not constant but rather vary over time as a function of 
changes in market illiquidity.
The new tests of the effects of illiquidity over time show that expected market illiquidity has a 
positive and significant effect on ex ante stock excess return, and unexpected illiquidity has a 
negative and significant effect on contemporaneous stock return. The negative effect of 
unexpected illiquidity is because of higher realized illiquidity that raises expected illiquidity, 
which in turn leads to higher stock expected return. Then, stock prices ceteris paribus should 
decline to make the expected return rise. The effects of illiquidity on stock excess return 
remain significant after including in the model two variables that are known to affect expected 
stock returns: the default yield premium on low-rated corporate bonds and the term yield 
premium on long-term Treasury bonds.
The effects over time of illiquidity on stock excess return differ across stocks by their 
liquidity or size: the effects of both expected and unexpected illiquidity are stronger on the 
returns of small stock portfolios where most of the liquidity guaranteed shares would belong 
to. This suggests that the variations over time in the ‘small firm effect’ of the excess return on 
small firms’ stock are partially due to changes in market illiquidity. This is because in times 
of illiquidity, there is a ‘flight to liquidity’ that makes large stocks relatively more attractive.
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The greater sensitivity of small stocks to illiquidity means that these stocks are subject to 
greater illiquidity risk which, if priced, should result in a higher illiquidity risk premium.
The results suggest that the stock excess return, usually referred to as the ‘risk premium’, is in 
part a premium for stock illiquidity. This contributes to the explanation of the puzzle that the 
equity premium is too high. The results mean that stock excess returns reflect not only the 
higher risk but also the lower liquidity of stock compared to Treasury securities. The theories 
here build a solid ground for the premise that Liquidity Providers bring certainty to the market 
as they make the share less sensitive to liquidity changes. That in turn should lead in lower 
expected stock returns - or a higher share price.
Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000) study commonality in liquidity. Even if the subject 
is only in distant relation to my paper I will go through their findings in order to shed more 
detailed light on the characteristics of liquidity. They claim that liquidity is more than just an 
attribute of a single asset. Individual liquidity measures co-move with each other. Even after 
accounting for well-known individual determinants of liquidity such as trading volume, 
volatility, and price, commonality retains a significant influence.
Recognizing the existence of commonality in liquidity allows uncovering evidence that 
inventory risks and asymmetric information both affect an individual stock’s liquidity. A 
share’s spread is positively related to the number of individual transactions but negatively 
related to the aggregate level of trading in the entire market. Their interpretation is that this 
pattern is a manifestation of two effects: 1. a diminution in inventory risk from greater 
market-wide trading activity, most plausibly by uninformed traders, and 2. an increase in 
asymmetric information risk occasioned by informed traders attempting to conceal their 
activities by breaking trades into small units, thus increasing the number of transactions. 
Although, commonality is the instrument used here to reveal asymmetric information effects 
on liquidity, they find no evidence that asymmetric information itself has common 
determinants. Co-movements in liquidity also suggest that transaction expenses might be 
better managed with appropriate timing. When spreads are low, managed portfolio turnover 
can be larger without sacrificing performance. However, they do not yet know whether 
common variations in trading costs are associated with other market phenomena, such as price 
swings, which might offset the benefits of time-managed trading.
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Finally, an important research issue not investigated their study is whether and to what extent 
liquidity has an important bearing on asset pricing. Transaction expenses can accumulate to 
become a relatively large decrement in total return when portfolios are turned over frequently. 
If liquidity shocks cannot be diversified, the sensitivity of an individual stock to such shocks 
could induce the market to require a higher average return. A higher expected return would 
surely be required for stocks with higher average trading costs, as I explained in the fist sub­
section of this chapter, but there might be an additional expected return increment demanded 
of stocks with higher sensitivities to broad liquidity shocks. Again the findings support my 
hypothesis that Liquidity Providers would provide firms with services that is in their best 
interests.
Above are presented only a tip of the iceberg when it comes to papers on liquidity. But not all 
authors support the ideas presented above. For instance Vayanos and Vila (1999) show in 
their article the effects of transaction costs on asset prices. They assume an overlapping 
generation’s economy with two riskless assets. The first asset is liquid while the second asset 
carries proportional transaction costs. They show that agents buy the liquid asset for short­
term investment and the illiquid asset for long-term investment. The price of the liquid asset 
increases, when transaction costs increase. The price of the illiquid asset decreases if the asset 
is in small supply, but may increase if the supply is large. They show that with transaction 
costs, agents first buy the illiquid asset, next buy the liquid asset, then sell the liquid asset, and 
finally sell the illiquid asset. For a short holding period transaction costs are important and the 
liquid asset is the better investment, despite being more expensive than the illiquid asset. For 
a long period transaction costs are less important and the illiquid asset is the better 
investment. As in Amihud and Mendelson (1986), each asset has its own clientele.
In addition, Constantinides (1986) is also a paper that does not consider spreads to be a major 
factor in the liquidity. He studied a partial equilibrium economy with two assets, a stock and a 
riskless security, and with proportionate costs of trading the stock. He formulates a two-asset, 
intertemporal portfolio selection model incorporating proportional trading costs. According to 
his results also demand for assets is shown to be sensitive to these costs. However, he 
suggests that transaction costs have only second-order effect on the ‘liquidity premium 
implied by asset returns.
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Further, Aiyagari and Gertler (1991) explore whether incorporating an explicit motive for 
holding liquid assets within an equilibrium asset pricing model helps explain the following 
features of asset returns and turnover in the post-war U.S. economy: 1) the low, risk-free real 
interest rate, 2) the large spread between returns on liquid assets and stocks, and 3) the greater 
transaction velocity of liquid assets relative to stocks. They introduce a demand for liquid 
assets by adding uninsured individual risk together with differential costs of trading securities. 
Numerical simulations attempting to match the return data generate a ratio of liquid assets to 
income considerably below the observed level.
The common factor in the three studies mentioned above is the fact that they consider 
transaction costs, i.e. spreads to be only a second-order effect on the liquidity. Their models 
are very complicated utility models, which try to derive an investor’s total utility equilibrium 
for holding a portfolio of different kinds of securities. Even if they claim that transaction costs 
have only a second order effect on the liquidity, they all are unanimous of the fact that the 
transaction costs influence trading.
2.3. The Impact of Market Microstructure Changes
The crowd of studies concerning market microstructure changes is very wide. Many of them 
have a great consensus within their results. In this section I will introduce some of the work 
done in the field. The papers that study the changes in minimum price variation are introduced 
in the next section as they are the ones that relate to this study most closely. Nevertheless, the 
papers on market environment changes and their effect on liquidity are important as the 
theory behind them ultimately relates to any improvement on the market.
A paper by Amihud et al. 1997, examines the value effects of improvements in the trading 
mechanism. The survey is done on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE) shares that were 
gradually transferred from a daily call auction to a mechanism where the call auction was 
followed by iterated continuous trading sessions.
The old auction method was conducted by human auctioneer until 1991. Limit and market 
orders were submitted to the investors before the opening or were retained by the brokers. 
Shares were called in a predetermined sequence by an auctioneer, who first announced the
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shares’ excess demand, positive or negative, at the previous close price and then changed the 
price based on the direction of excess demand. As the announced price changed, the excess 
demand decreased until equilibrium was reached. If equilibrium could not be reached, at a 
daily price increase of 10%, the stock was announced as ‘buyers only’ and the price was set at 
the previous day’s price plus 5% without executing any order. After two days of ‘buyers 
only’, the price was allowed to move without bound. Price declines were treated analogously. 
All in all, the mechanism was very inefficient.
The new method, called the variable price method, was designed to increase liquidity and 
efficiency. Traders’ ability to execute multiple transactions within the day mitigates the price 
impact of large orders. Traders can also correct the pricing errors after observing the 
transaction prices of the same and similar shares after obtaining additional market information 
that used to be unobservable. The improvements were in every way very significant.
Not surprisingly, in their paper they show that improvements in market microstructure are 
valuable. They found out that shares that were traded in a more efficient trading method 
experienced a significant and permanent price rise. To be more accurate, in their sample, the 
average cumulative abnormal return over the test period was about 5.5%. The results 
indicated a significant rise as the costs of improvement were quite modest. The cost of the 
system was estimated to be under $10 million. The 100 shares that were moved to the new 
improved trading method had an ex-ante market capitalization of $26 billion and experienced 
a gain of over $1.35 billion. The price rises were accompanied by significant increases in both 
market-adjusted volume and in the liquidity ratio indicating improved liquidity. The value 
gains were positively associated with the increase in liquidity. It must however be kept in 
mind that they studied a new system that improved the whole market structure and had thus 
very substantial effects on price discovery, liquidity and overall market quality. Therefore, I 
would not expect as drastic results in my paper.
One of the oldest papers in the field is done by Cooper et al. 1985. The paper examines the 
relationship of common stock liquidity to both exchange listing and price behavior during 
major up and down-movements on the market. The results are quite interesting.
Their main findings are as follows: First, their results show that the liquidity ratio tended to 
increase with market value and share price. However, the relationship was not in lockstep. In
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each of their market size-based deciles, the range of liquidity ratios was very wide.3 Thus they 
argue that, while size and price serve as gross proxies for liquidity, the exceptions are frequent 
enough to justify the information content of liquidity ratios and to explain why large investors 
are willing to pay for liquidity information.
Maybe the more interesting results stem from research on betas in the market up- and 
downswings. They report concrete evidence on the share price reaction behavior during the 
bull and bear markets. These results suggest that the liquidity of securities may affect their 
systematic risk relationships in a manner which differs somewhat from the risk-return norms 
prescribed by the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). In addition, the empirical findings 
indicate that liquidity may have a significant bearing on the degree of security price response 
to market upswings as compared to downswings—a phenomenon that might be attributable to 
both institutional arrangements and investor behavior. The results are supported in Amihud, 
Mendelson and Wood (1990), who found that during the stock market crash of 19 October 
1987, price declines were greater for stocks whose liquidity suffered most, and price recovery 
was greater for stocks whose liquidity subsequently improved.
Baker and Khan (1993) studied the effect of dual trading through unlisted trading privileges 
(UTPs) on liquidity and stock returns. They argue that the differences in market structures 
affects stock returns through liquidity and services provided by the competing markets. They 
compared 852 AMEX and NYSE firms that began unlisted trading on the Philadelphia, 
Pacific, Midwest or Cincinnati exchanges between 1984 and 1988. Their results show 
significantly positive returns around SEC announcements of regional exchanges filing for 
UTPs. The evidence suggests the initial news of UTPs trading had positive, short-term 
valuation implications for existing shareholders. Moreover, they conclude that their evidence 
that interdealer and intermarket competition are positively related to liquidity, and that 
liquidity is positively related to share returns suggests that increased competition among 
specialists and markets is desirable for improving the transactional efficiency of equity 
markets.
3 Amihud and Mendelson (1986) tested for the significance for the firm-size factor in their model and found out 
that firm-size is not significant in their model. They argue that any ‘size effect’ may be a consequence of a 
spread effect, with firm size serving as a proxy for liquidity.
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Many other authors have found results similar to those above in the case of market 
microstructure changes. The general result is that a market improvement that efficiently 
decreases frictions in the market could lead into an improvement in liquidity and that this 
increased liquidity would then be associated with a positive price reaction. Accordingly, I am 
waiting to get results that are similar to those. In the next section I introduce some work done 
on the minimum price variation.
2.4. The Minimum Price Variation and Liquidity
So far it seems to be quite obvious that by improving the market environment the liquidity 
improves alongside. Liquidity Providers’ main means of improving liquidity is the quote 
guarantee on the market and the minimum price variation, i.e. a limited spread. In the past 
decade, many stock exchanges have reduced their tick sizes or totally altered their pricing to 
use of decimalization instead of tick-sizes. I find these studies to be really close to my study 
because of the fact that in both cases the major change is concerning spreads.
One of the first and most well known papers in this field is the one by Harris (1994). In his 
study he develops a cross sectional model for the discrete spread and uses the estimated model 
to predict the reduction in the spread, the change in $1/16 quote frequency, trading volume, 
and market depth once the tick size is reduced from $1/8 to $1/16. The data consists of NYSE 
and AMEX shares in 1989. The starting point for this study was the assumption that the 
minimum price variation will affect trading volume if it forces dealers to quote a larger spread 
than they would otherwise quote. Large bid-ask spreads make trading expensive.
The study presents several empirical analyses of spreads, quotation sizes and trading volumes. 
The study uses standard and switching regression analyses to explore how price levels are 
related to average spreads, quotation sizes, and trading volumes. The estimated regression 
models are then used to project how quotation sizes and trading volumes would change if the 
traders could use smaller tick-sizes. In addition, a model with discrete bid-ask spreads is 
introduced which is used to evaluate how quoted spreads would change given a different 
minimum price variation.
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The results are convincing. According to the results, a decrease in the minimum price 
variation from $1/8 to $1/16 would result on average in a 36 percent spread decline for the 
stocks priced under $10. At the same time, the displayed size at the narrowed inside 
quotations for these shares would decrease 15 percent. Even though 1 am not dealing with 
quite the same subject; the major determinant, decreasing spread4, is the same and thus I am 
waiting the results to be quite similar to the ones in the Harris (1994) study.
Ahn et al. (1996) studied the actual tick-size reduction from $1/8 to $1/16 in 1992 when 
NYSE and AMEX lowered their minimum price variation. It is the first paper to test and 
evaluate the Harris (1994) model and is therefore a critical paper in the literature on the topic 
of minimum price variation.
The results suggest that the Harris (1994) model has its flaws. Even though the displayed and 
inside quotations declined in their paper, the reduction was much smaller. They came up with 
results that post a decline of 19 percent in both the quoted and effective spreads of the most 
actively traded shares. The least traded shares experienced only a 4% decline in their spreads. 
The proportion of spreads quoted at increments of $1/16 increased from nothing to 28%, and 
the spread quoted at $1/8 decreased from 72 to 51%.
The declines in spreads, however, were not associated with increased trading and deepened 
market depth. In those parts the results contradict with the findings of Harris (1994). The 
results in Ahn et al (1996) show that the trading volumes increased after the tick-size 
reduction but the increase was also reported for the group that did not experience a tick-size 
reduction. Therefore, they reject the possibility of a tick-size reduction of being the source of 
this increase in value. The differences between the control group and the sample group were 
not statistically significant. Thus, they argue that the increase in trading would be related to 
common factors such as a time trend, rather than caused by the tick-size reduction5.
4 In the Harris (1994) the minimum tick size was lowered from $1/8 to $1/16 giving traders the possibility to use 
lower tick sizes. In my study the upper level of the tick size is predetermined. Spreads however decreased in the 
Harris study and the impacts on the market quality are much the same.
5 In my study the starting dates of trading with liquidity providers are spilled in the course of about three years. 
Therefore, time trends and common factors are self-excluded in this study.
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In his paper, Jeffrey M. Bacidore (1996), studies the impact of decimalization on market 
quality on the Toronto Stock Exchange. The starting points are quite different to the previous 
two studies. First, the study is an event study whereas Harris made a prediction model. 
Second, Ahn et al. studied only a small range of shares, i.e. shares that were trading between 
$1 and 5$. Bacidore’s study is made on the largest and most active Canadian exchange 
avoiding the problems of ‘quote matchers’ and the ‘competition effect’6.
His main findings are as follows. First, for shares trading above €5, the bid-ask spreads, 
quoted and effective, decreased significantly after decimalization. This decline was 
significantly related to stock price and trading activity. Second, the average daily volume for 
the period following the move to decimal pricing did not increase significantly. That would 
mean that Liquidity Providers would have been adversely affected. Finally, along the lines of 
Ahn et al. (1996), the study finds that the Harris (1994) model tends to overpredict the decline 
in spreads following a reduction in the minimum tick size.
The abovementioned studies on tick size reduction raise many issues concerning my study. 
The most evident is the impact on trading volume and thus liquidity. The previous studies 
found that even if the spreads declined, the trading volume was untouched. Would that mean 
that spread declines do not have any influence on trading volumes and therefore, liquidity? I 
would argue that even if the external essence in my paper is quite similar, i.e. the effects are 
mainly due to the lowered spreads, the results could vary from the ones presented above. The 
main reason behind my reasoning is that in my study most of the shares are really illiquid. 
They are subject to infrequent trading and substantially large spreads. In fact, there may be 
days that there are no quotes on the market at all. Therefore, trading with them has been not 
only expensive but also difficult (if not impossible). The studies above are done on the 
markets that are already fully functioning and satisfied markets meaning that the money 
available for the market is already there. Therefore, aggregate changes would have little 
effect, if at all, on liquidity, given that the money available for the market would not be 
increased at the same time. And, finally, as it has been presented already earlier in this paper, 
the institutional investors may increase their interest and ownership in these liquidity 
guaranteed shares.
6 Harris (1994) argues that a reduction in tick-size could lead to lower depth as market makers hide more of their 
orders to avoid “quote matchers” that would decrease their profits. The competition effect (se e.g. Khan and 
Baker, 1993) proposes that competition between market makers in dual listings would result in an improvement 
of the transactional efficiency of equity markets.
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2.5. Market Efficiency
Liquidity and market efficiency has been brought up in many recent papers. The concept of 
market efficiency is usually understood as the lack of market frictions on trading. Another 
way to view market efficiency would be to describe the market along the lines of efficient 
market theory. Any frictions, such as trading costs, taxes, holding cost or even costs stemming 
from acquiring information, are considered to drive the market further away from efficient 
markets. Naturally, liquidity is one factor.
The presence of Liquidity Providers on the market should in theory have an effect on the 
market efficiency as they first of all guarantee that the trades at all can take place. 
Furthermore, they help diminish the costs involved in trading. Many papers exist about 
market quality improvements due to market microstructure changes. Amihud et al. (1997) 
studied the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange where stocks were transferred from daily auction to a 
mechanism where the call auction was followed by iterated continuous auction. Pagano and 
Schwartz (2003) investigated a closing calls impact on market quality at Euronext Paris. The 
results are as expected. As the trading becomes easier, frictions diminish and the quality of the 
market improves. Next I will introduce these papers in more detail.
In Amihud et al. (1997), they argue that movement from a ‘call auction method’ to ‘variable 
method'7 should enable investors to incorporate information into the share price more quickly 
and with greater precision. Therefore, under the variable method, the pricing errors relative to 
the contemporaneous market index should be smaller because of both faster adjustment to 
changes in the market index and smaller firm specific errors given the information available 
from the observed prices of the same related shares.
They test possible improvement in market quality with a Relative Residual Dispersion- 
method, first introduced by Amihud and Mendelson (1989b, 1991b). The method is based on 
the variance of returns across securities, as a descriptive indicator of the efficiency of a 
trading mechanism. The variance is the market model error term. According to their results, 
the improvement in the market microstructure had a positive effect on market quality. Their 
results posted improvement in market efficiency for 78% of the sample shares and the results 
were statistically significant. The results support the fact that improvements in the market
7 Amihud and Mendelson (1997) is introduced in more detail in chapter 2.2.
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microstructure would have positive effects on market quality. As the return variance becomes 
smaller it also reduces the measurement of risk, i.e. volatility.
Pagano and Schwartz (2003) study the closing call’s impact on market quality. Even if the 
paper does not handle liquidity directly, the findings on market microstructure improvements 
are interesting. A call auction differs from continuous trading in the following way: in a 
continuous market, a trade is made whenever a bid and offer match or cross each other, 
whereas in a call auction, the buy and sell orders are cumulated for each stock for 
simultaneous execution in a multilateral, batched trade, at a single price, at a predetermined 
time. By consolidating liquidity at specific times, a call auction is intended to reduce 
execution costs for individual participants and to sharpen the accuracy of price discovery for 
the broad market.
They also keep the market model as a starting point for their tests. They however, do not 
study the price variance but the market model’s explanatory power, R2. They show that R2 
increased in all measurement intervals suggesting that the market efficiency has increased. 
They conclude that while the market efficiency has improved, the closing call has lowered the 
costs for individual participants and sharpened the price discovery of the broad market.
Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2006) study liquidity and market efficiency. They argue 
that for stock prices to fluctuate randomly, the market must absorb order imbalances in a 
timely manner. Further, it stands to reason that market efficiency is not immune to frictions, 
such as illiquidity, that are barriers to efficiency-creating arbitrage activity. They examine 
how the capacity of the equity market to absorb imbalances varies through time and across 
different liquidity regimes. The analysis relies on a sample of the NYSE stocks that traded 
every day during the 1993-2002 decade.
Their paper provides ample evidence that order imbalances do indeed predict future returns 
over very short intervals, more so for the smaller firms. But the extent of this predictability 
declines over the sample period. Liquidity plays an important role in the maintenance of 
market efficiency. The market’s ability to absorb order imbalances is greater in liquid periods 
than in illiquid ones. The microstructure literature also considers the notion of informational 
efficiency, which is defined as the amount of private information revealed in prices. Chordia 
et al. (2006) shed light on this concept of efficiency by considering per hour open-to-
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close/close-to-open variance ratios. Variance ratios generally increased while first order return 
autocorrelations declined as the minimum tick size was reduced. That pattern is particularly 
strong for the smaller firms. Taken together, these findings suggest that the observed increase 
in open-to close/close-to-open variance ratios is not due to increased mispricing in the lower 
tick size regimes, but is consistent with an increase in the amount of private information that 
is incorporated in prices following the secular decrease in bid-ask spreads accompanying the 
lowering of the tick size. In sum, it appears that improved liquidity stimulates a higher degree 
of informational efficiency as there is more trading on private information following a 
reduction in the tick size.
The presence of Liquidity Providers in the Helsinki Exchange and Stockholmsbörsen 
certainly will have effect on the informational efficiency. As I have described before it is in 
the Liquidity Providers’ best interest to know the fair price for the company they are 
guaranteeing. If they do not, they really lack the ability to make profits - as well as the ability 
to avoid losses. Therefore, the observed market price, the one quoted by the Liquidity 
Providers, should decline the problem of privately held information and enhance price 
discovery. In addition, I assume that a spread decline and the quote guarantee are significant 
enough improvements to have an enhancing effect on market efficiency.
2.6. Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Some Issues about the Methodology
A very interesting question for both financial economists and investors is whether investments 
in improving the market microstructure add value. Ceteris paribus, improved liquidity is 
expected to increase securities values because rational investors discount securities more 
heavily in the existence of higher trading costs. This proposition by Amihud and Mendelson 
(1986) has been empirically supported in various studies.
The method used to study the possible price rise is first introduced by Fama, Fisher, Jensen 
and Roll (1969). It is widely used in the event study papers to study if an event has impact on 
the value of underlying securities. The common market model is based on the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model or CAPM. The model is used to examine the share returns around the event- 
date. The model is presented in more detail in the next chapter.
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The event study methods have remained quite unchanged in past literature. Brown and 
Warner (1980) discuss about event study methods in their paper. Their goal in the study is not 
to introduce different kinds of methods but to find the best method for conducting an event 
study. They compared different event study-methods to reveal the abnormal price behavior 
around the event date by simulating the market. Their main findings were that there really is 
not a large deviation from one method to another. However, they did not have the opportunity 
to compare Fama, Fisher and Jensen three factor model as it was introduced to the public in 
the early 90’s.
In simplified terms, the Three Factor Model punishes stocks classified as small-cap or value 
(defined as a stock with a high book value to market value). Fama and French are strong 
supporters of the Efficient Market Hypothesis. They believe that you only get excess return 
for taking on extra risk. Thus, if small-caps or value stocks have a higher than average return, 
then they must be riskier. The model is widely used in academic literature to study abnormal 
returns.
Dimson (1979) is a paper studying beta-bias with illiquid shares. He finds out that the shares 
subject to infrequent trading have downward biased betas. The major source of bias is the 
tendency for prices recorded at the end of a time period to represent the outcome of a 
transaction which occurred earlier in or prior to the period in question. Fisher (1966) pointed 
out that this causes an index constructed from such share price data to be an average of the 
temporally ordered underlying values of the shares. Consequently, positive serial correlation 
is induced into returns which are calculated from the index and the estimated variance of 
returns on the index is biased downward.
Shares which suffer from non-trading also have their covariance with the market substantially 
underestimated. The downward bias in the covariance of frequently traded shares is, however, 
much smaller. Thus, infrequently traded securities have a beta estimate which is biased 
downwards, while the figure for frequently traded securities is upward biased. It is the 
objective of that article to present a method for obtaining an unbiased estimate of the 
systematic risk of a share, when the share and some or all of the securities in the market are 
subject to infrequent trading.
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I, however, find it sufficient to use the common market model. The rationale behind it is the 
fact that it is widely recognized method in the event study-methodology. Moreover, the 
additional accuracy that the Three Factor Model could bring is not essential for the purpose of 
my study. In addition, Amihud and Mendelson (1986) tested for the well recognized firm size 
effect on liquidity. They built a model where the natural logarithm of firm size was added to 
their model while their original other two factors, ß and spread, remained the same. Their 
results suggested that after the addition the ß and spread prevail, whereas the size-effect is 
insignificant. That could mean that the return-spread relation cannot be explained by a ‘size 
effect’ even if the latter exists. In fact, any ‘size effect’ may be a consequence of a spread 
effect, with firm size serving as a proxy for liquidity.
The results in Dimson (1979) would suggest that there should be some beta correction made 
at least for the least liquid shares. I, however, find it sufficient to use the basic beta of the 
common market model in evaluation of abnormal returns. The correction of the bias in the 
betas leaves room for another study and would require expertise in that field. In my context it 
would not be reasonable to do since it would not bring enough value added to the study. 
Moreover, the post-sample betas could be different from the pre-event betas, already due to 
the fact that the liquidity improvement could alter market risk.
2.7. Papers on Liquidity Providers
Anand et al. (2005) study the impact of Liquidity Providers in Stockholmsbörsen, They 
perform their study on 50 previously illiquid firms that contracted for market making services 
provided on the Stockholmbörsen. The study is similar to this one.
Their main findings are that spreads narrow by a statistically significant amount following the 
initiation of market making services. Their additional tests suggest that the decrease in 
spreads is not due to confounding factors. They also find evidence of market depth increases. 
Accompanying the increase in depth, they found a significant increase in average trade size, 
suggesting that traders no longer find it necessary to break up their orders to accommodate 
low market depth.
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Accompanying the increase in depth, they also found evidence of a statistically significant 
decrease in return volatility. The decrease is found following the start of market making 
activities for both intra-day and inter-day return volatility. That would suggest that Liquidity 
Providers prevent orders from walking the book, in a manner very similar to that found for 
NYSE specialists. They also found that trading activity increases following the contracting, 
suggesting that Liquidity Providers are actively engaged in trading with public customers. 
Further, they found evidence that the average CAR for 10 days after the contract start date is a 
statistically significant 6.19%. According to their statistics the CARs were inversely related to 
spread improvement, suggesting that the CARs are not the result of a market wide trend. In 
addition, they examined LP firms’ trading profits and found no evidence of compensation 
other than the contract fees. Summed up, these findings suggest that firms may benefit from 
taking a proactive role in the market making of their securities and that this decision is no 
different than other projects a firm faces.
The findings above are also consistent with other papers concerning the subject. For instance 
Glosten (1989) emphasizes an alternate rationale that the liquidity providing may prevent 
market failures by supplying liquidity during periods when the limit order book is thin.
Mann et al. (2002) study a sample of 19 firms of medium-to-high liquidity and 37 firms of 
low liquidity for which a liquidity providing system was introduced by the Paris Bourse 
between 1995 and 1998. They conducted an event study to analyze cumulative abnormal 
returns around the introduction of the liquidity providing system. They estimated cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) over an event window that began five days before the Liquidity 
Providers’ announcement date and ended 10 days after the stocks started trading with a 
Liquidity Provider. For the illiquid sample, they found a statistically significant CAR of 4.4% 
during the event window; however, for the liquid sample, the CAR was not statistically 
different from zero. They also found support for the Glosten (1989) hypothesis that a 
designated market-maker may prevent market failure. They also found that a decrease in the 
probability of market failure is associated with a statistically significant positive return around 
the adoption of a Liquidity Provider, which supports the link between trading costs and 
required returns.
Kehr et al. (2001) provided an analysis of the specialists’ function and their impact on the 
market outcome. Their data set enabled identifying the trades that specialists make on their
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own account. Accordingly, they could eliminate these trades and determine the price that 
would have been obtained without the specialist’s participation. Comparing this resulting 
series of hypothetical prices to the actual transaction prices, they found that specialist 
participation reduces return volatility which is consistent with the results in Anand et al. 
(2005). A further analysis showed that the actual prices are closer than the hypothetical prices 
to the surrounding prices of the continuous trading session. These results indicated that the 
specialists provide a valuable service to the market. To assess the cost of this service they 
calculate the specialists’ trading profits and found them to be indistinguishable from zero. 
Their compensation thus appeared to be restricted to the commission received. The results are 
then in accordance with Anand et al. (2005) and Madhavan and Panchpagesan (2000).
Madhavan and Panchapagesan (2000) analyzed the NYSE opening auction and found that 
specialist participation enhances price discovery and reduces return variability. The returns 
earned on the specialist’s transactions are “relatively modest” (Madhavan and Panchapagesan, 
2000, p. 655), though significant.
Nimalendran and Petrella (2002) find an improvement in market quality on the Italian Stock 
Exchange after specialists were introduced for thinly traded stocks. However, they limit their 
study to the NYSE framework which is not directly applicable to this paper, as the 
“specialist” in our study differs in very fundamental ways from the NYSE specialist. 
Nimalendran and Petrella (2002) do not analyze the effect of specialist introduction on the 
cost of capital for the firms entering into market-making.
2.8. Conclusion of the Literature Review
The literature presented above is only a fraction of all of the literature related to liquidity as 
the liquidity is a widely studied area. The past literature has found concrete evidence that the 
spread plays a significant role in liquidity. There prevails a common knowledge that the 
investors discount shares with large spreads more heavily and makes the expected returns of 
those shares higher. Therefore, I expect to get evidence of increased share values, at least 
where the liquidity improvement is the greatest. I also argue that the market environment of 
the participating shares will change drastically as the spreads go down and as the quotes and 
trades are to some extent guaranteed.
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Many of the shares in my sample are already very liquid and trading with small spreads. 
Therefore, the results for them could be most closely related to the earlier studies of tick-size 
reduction or decimalization, which suggest that while the spreads go down there still is no 
evidence of increased trading or deepened market depths. However, in those studies the 
market was fully functioning before the changes in spreads, and therefore the reduction in 
spreads, at least in theory, would only increase the trading volumes in that part that the money 
is saved in the spreads, i.e. the money available for extra trading.
In my study the illiquid shares are the shares that have faced significant problems in trading 
volume and in the form of large spreads. Many of them had pre-event spreads of over 10% 
making them unattractive for investors. Accordingly, there may have not been quotes at all on 
the market for days. Particularly institutional investors prefer liquid shares over illiquid ones. 
In addition, the least liquid shares tend to be small firms that face other problems such as 
asymmetric information.
There are some prior papers concerning the impacts of Liquidity Providers on the market. All 
of them (at least the ones I found) have found positive market reactions due to the 
implementation of liquidity providing system. They are also in accordance with other 
theories, such as the liquidity premium introduced by Amihud et al (1986). Accordingly, 
those papers have found evidence on declined spreads, reduced volatility, increased trading 
volumes and abnormal returns. The paper on the impact of Liquidity Providers in the 
Stockholmsbörsen is naturally really close to my work. I however have a larger data set with 
Finnish shares alone. I am waiting to get results similar to those in this paper.
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3. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
In this chapter I will introduce the data and discuss some aspects of it. I will also include the 
spread analysis in this chapter as the further study of spreads is very limited. The data is on 
closing spreads. I will start by introducing the data and selected aspects of it. Then I will go 
into spread analysis. Finally I will introduce sampling rationale.
3.1. Data
The data consists of 108 shares traded on the Helsinki Exchange and Stockholmsbörsen. The 
participating shares have all made a contract with some Liquidity Provider. The only criterion 
I have set for the companies is that they have data available for 100 days before and after the 
event. The data source in this study is Thomson Datastream.
The Copenhagen Stock Exchange, also part of the OMX-group, supports Liquidity Providers 
as well and has provided guidelines for entering into Liquidity Provider agreements. 
Furthermore, the Copenhagen Stock Exchange requires a spread of not more than 2 percent to 
enter the MidCap+ segment and a spread of not more than 4 percent to enter the SmaIlCap+ 
segment. In addition, there are requirements for turnover, etc. Many companies have signed 
up with a Liquidity Provider to comply with these requirements. I, however, do not have 
information on Danish companies taking advantage of Liquidity Providers nor the dates of 
implementation. Therefore, this study excludes Danish stocks.
The original data consisted of 121 companies. 12 of them had to be excluded as they did not 
have data available for the whole event period. That left me with a sample consisting of 3 
Large Cap shares, 24 Mid Cap shares, and 81 Small Cap shares of which 29 are Finnish and 
79 are Swedish shares. Detailed information of the participating shares is listed in Appendix 
A.
The study concentrates on trading activity, spreads and returns. For this purpose, I have 
collected daily closing prices, spreads, and trading volumes for all the shares in the sample 
from 2002 to today. I also have total return indices for all shares to mitigate the effects of 
corporate actions, such as dividends and mergers from the sample. In addition, I have relevant
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market information for the corresponding dates. In the following subsections I will go through 
the data validation and data sampling in more detail.
Figure 1.
Composition of the liquidity guaranteed shares based on their market capitalization is presented below.
Helsinki Exchange Stockholmsbörsen
The picture above presents the composition of the participating companies based on their 
market capitalization. It gives us a quite good picture of what kinds of companies are at least 
at this point engaged in the liquidity providing system. Because of the nature of liquidity 
providing, it is not surprising that Small Cap companies dominate the sample. Especially, in 
the Helsinki Exchange, most of the companies using Liquidity Providers are listed in the New 
Market or the Investor’s List which are lists for the companies that do not yet meet all of the 
requirements to be listed in the Helsinki Exchange Main List. Accordingly, those shares are 
subject to illiquidity and larger spreads which makes the use of Liquidity Providers for them 
more attractive. Subsequently, the Large Cap and Mid Cap shares are more liquid already and 
thus the impact of the liquidity providing system is not expected to have such a sizable impact 
on their trading volumes and spreads as on their less liquid counterparts.
The share data is collected around the event date. In Helsinki, the participating shares 
announced the Liquidity Provider deals on the same day as the liquidity guarantee 
commenced. The information is published in the form of an exchange company notice. In 
addition, a marker “LP” was added to the official list to indicate that a share has a Liquidity 
Provider.
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In Sweden, the announcement is done in a different manner. Similarly, the liquidity 
guaranteed shares get a marker on the official list starting from day one. The announcements 
however, are released arbitrarily. Usually companies announce them one trading day before 
the first contract date, while some make the announcement a couple of days later. Therefore, I 
will use two d-days in my graphical presentations; I will be using the announcement date 
when trying to capture abnormal returns around the event and first trading day with the 
liquidity guarantee to graphically show the change in trading volume. In other models I use a 
closed window around the event date in order to exclude any abnormal behavior from the 
results.
Figure 2.
The quarterly development of the amount of the participating shares until Q1 2006.
In the figure 2 above is the quarterly development of the amount of the participating shares. It 
can be seen that the LP-system was introduced in the Stockholmsbörsen about one year before 
it was introduced in Helsinki. The patterns, between these two stock exchanges, slightly differ 
from each other. In the data property’s point of view, the main concern is the quarterly 
deviation of the new deals across the calendar year. It is an important issue because I have to 
decide if any control variables are needed to be included in the models to control for overall 
market movement. From the picture above it is fair to say that the development is evenly 
enough spread for this study.
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Most Finnish and Swedish shares pay out their dividends in the spring time. As shown in 
Figure 2, the first halves of the years do not dominate the sample. However, I find it adequate 
to adjust the share prices for dividends. In addition, all data is adjusted for all relevant 
corporate actions, such as splits and divestitures and so on. The total return indices for each 
share will serve this purpose. This data is readily available from Thomson Datastream 
database. These total return indices are calculated as all profit distribution reinvested in the 
underlying share. In addition, the share indices are adjusted for any corporate actions, such as 
splits.
The indices I will be using to describe overall market movements are OMX Helsinki CAP 
Total Return Index and OMX Stockholm Benchmark Total Return Index.
In Helsinki it is very important to use a portfolio index that limits the weight of any single 
company. The reason is the dominant role of Nokia in the HEX. The general price index 
usually correlates to a great extent with Nokia’s share price. In order to exclude Nokia’s - or 
any other player’s for that matter - dominant role, I will use HEX portfolio total return index. 
OMX Helsinki CAP Total Return Index consists of all the main list shares. The weight of the 
constituent stocks is based on the market value adjusted by the free float, which means that 
only the part of the share capital that is considered available for trading is included in the 
index. In Hex Portfolio Index the maximum weight of any company is 10% of the index 
portfolio. That means no one individual share can not dominate the index.
Even though there is a larger base of companies in Stockholm and there may be less bias in 
the general index due to the lack of one prominent company, I will use a similar index to 
OMX Helsinki CAP for Swedish shares also. The OMX Stockholm Benchmark Index 
consists of the 80 to 100 largest and most traded stocks, representing the majority of sectors. 
In this Index, the weights of the constituent stocks are also based on the market value adjusted 
by the free float. The index serves as an indicator of the overall trend on the Stockholm Stock 
Exchange and is a good overall indicator of Stockholmsbörsen’s performance.
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3.2. Closing Spreads
The spreads are maybe the most obvious cost of trading for the investors after the direct 
transaction costs. At any given time, in equity trading, an investor most likely has to pay more 
for a security than he could sell it back to the market for. Accordingly, in many prior studies it 
has been shown that spreads play a great role in the accurate price discovery and trading. 
Obviously, a large spread, say even 10%, makes a share less desirable than one with a smaller 
spread.
The closing spreads represent a snapshot value of the trading day. They cannot be used to 
study overall effective spreads. Even so, it is interesting to see if there are any signs of 
diminished closing spreads. If so, it would provide at least weak evidence of the market 
improvement; closing spreads would have diminished. However, due to the fact that they can 
provide us with only weak statistical evidence, I will introduce the results more as descriptive 
statistics in this part of the study than try to make any heavy conclusions based on them. I 
will, however, use the spread changes as determinants when dividing the data into smaller 
samples in the study. Table la presents the closing spreads for all shares, the 54 most liquid 
and 54 least liquid shares.
Table la
Spread Changes - Based on Pre-Event Liquidity
78-days average spreads before and after the event for the whole sample and for pre-event most and least liquid 
shares. T-tests are conducted to see if the daily average spread across the samples differ from each others. The 
spreads are percentage units calculated from the bid price. The differences represent the percentage decline from 
the previous value.
































Number of Negative 102 (94.44%) 50 (92.59%) 52 (96.30%)
* Significant at 5% level. 
** Significant at 1% level. 
*** Significant at 0.1% level
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The comparison between before and after spreads clearly shows us in figure la above, that the 
closing spreads have significantly diminished in the whole sample as well as in the sub­
samples. In the whole sample it seems that the closing spreads are 77.82% smaller than before 
the LP-system was implemented and 94.44% of shares experienced a decline in their spreads. 
As predicted, the most illiquid shares experienced a larger change than the most liquid shares. 
On average, the liquid sub-sample shares almost cut half of their spreads from 2.37% to 
1.22% calculated from the bid price. Illiquid sub-sample shares declined on average 88.09% 
from 7.05% to 0.84% of the bid price. The percentage of shares that experienced a decline in 
spreads is 92.59% and 96.30%, respectively. T-statistics are statistically highly significant for 
all sub-samples being 30.4269, 12.5910, 32.6837 for all shares, pre-event liquid and pre-event 
illiquid, respectively.
According to the results, the pre-event least liquid shares would have lower absolute closing 
spreads than the liquid ones, a finding that seems to be unreasonable. The reason why it is so 
amazing is simply the fact that the spreads before emergence of Liquidity Providers on the 
market were on average at 7.05%. However, to see if this would really be the case, further 
studies should be made with the accurate intraday-data on all trades. At least the results 
suggest that the number of shares experienced a drop in the spreads is larger in the illiquid 
shares sub-samples.
Table lb
Spread Changes - Based on Spread Decline
78-days average spreads before and after the event for the whole sample and for small spread decline and the 
large spread decline groups. T-tests are conducted to see if the daily average spread across the samples differ 
from each others. The spreads are percentage units calculated from the bid price. The differences represent the 
percentage decline from the before value.
All___________________________ Small Spread Change Large Spread Change
N - 108 N = 54 N = 54
Before After Difference Before After Difference Before After Difference
Average Spread 0.04665 0.01034 -77.82 % 0.01856 0.01348 -27.37 % 0.0747415 0.0072109 -90.35 %
St.Dev 0.00840 0.00550 0.00290 0.00497 0.00272 0.00224 0.01593 0.01037 0.00556
t-stat 30.4269 *** 7.9210 *** 31.3776 ***
Number of Negative 102 (94.44%) 48 (88.89%) 54 (100%)
* Significant at 5% level. 
** Significant at 1% level. 
*** Significant at 0.1% level
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Table lb presents the closing spreads before and after the event for all shares, and the divided 
sub-samples according to the reduction in size of their spreads. It clearly shows the 
development of the spreads in the whole sample. Even in the group with the smallest change 
the average spread has diminished 27.37%. The 54 largest spread reductions amount to, on 
average, a 90.35% decline from the pre-event levels. All the reductions are statistically highly 
significant having t-statistics of 7.9210 and 31.3776 for the smallest and largest spread 
decline groups, respectively.
At this point, it is evident that the closing spreads have diminished. But then again that is 
what Liquidity Providers are there for: to guarantee that they do. It must be kept in mind that 
the used spreads still are closing spreads and based on the study on them I can state only that 
the closing spreads have diminished. There is no meaningful way to assure that real spreads 
have declined throughout the sample days. Judging by the closing spreads, it seems to be the 
case that the least liquid shares in both countries have improved their liquidity a great bit, as 
their spreads used to be on average around 7% of the bid price before this new system was 
implemented.
One more word of warning arises from the minimum requirements of Liquidity Providing. 
According to these requirements, the Liquidity Provider has to guarantee at minimum 4 
trading lots at 85% of the time of the continuous trading as well as in the applicable opening 
and closing auctions. A straightforward conclusion is that even if there were Liquidity 
Providers' quotes on the market almost all of the time, it does not mean that there are enough 
of these quotes to meet the market demand. In other words, effective spreads in general may 
be much larger than the ones we have witnessed here. Only a study with accurate trading data 
would give us an answer.
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3.3. Data Samples
As the target of the study is to study the effects of diminished spreads on the market, the first 
thing to do is to establish a link between improved liquidity and diminished spreads. Of 
course, at this point, we already know that the spreads have diminished, and accordingly, any 
other changes would be at least partly a result of this reduction. However, in order to get more 
meaningful results to support the theory I find it adequate to continue the study also from the 
spreads point of view.
The theory that I introduced in the first chapter, suggests that the liquidity of underlying 
shares improves as spreads decline. In other words, the declining spreads would lead into 
increased trading. This improved liquidity should be seen as improved market quality and 
finally all the improvements in turn should be something that investors put value on. 
Therefore, I have initially divided the sample into three sub-samples: 1) Percentage change in 
spread, 2) pre- event liquidity, and 3) Magnitude of increase in trading. Of course, I will also 
introduce the results for the whole sample of shares throughout the study.
First, I have divided all shares into two, based on the decline in the closing spreads. This 
sampling is done in order to try to establish a link between the decreased spreads and any 
other market reactions. At least, the very basis of the liquidity providing is to try to affect the 
market by lowering spreads. Thus, any other market reaction should be as a result of that. 
Many prior studies have shown results that indicate that decreases in spreads cause positive 
market reactions.
Second, shares are divided into sub-samples based on the presumption that the most liquid 
shares are anticipated to have less of an impact from liquidity providing. The least traded 
shares in general are expected to be more subject to infrequent trading, larger spreads, and 
even asymmetric information. Therefore, I can expect that they are also much further away 
from the efficient market hypothesis. The most traded shares however have been frequently 
traded and their spreads have been under the Liquidity Providers’ guaranteed values and thus 
closer to the efficient market hypothesis. The data is divided in two by their euro trading 
volume median in all sub-samples.
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Third, the shares are divided into sub-samples based on their trading volume improvement. 
That sampling is done to capture the effect of improved liquidity to some extent. I believe, 
that by doing so, I can best capture the effects of improved liquidity on the market without 
taking a stand as to what has caused the improvement and thus more closely to link it to the 
theory of liquidity. That should give us a better view of the market behavior in the case of 
improving liquidity. Of course, it’s also true that shares that have experienced the largest 
increase in trading volumes have benefited the most in terms of liquidity. Therefore, any other 
market reaction in that group should reflect possible benefits of the Liquidity Providers at 
best. On the other hand, shares that have experienced the smallest increase in trading volumes 
should at least in theory have less, if any, other market reactions. That would be the case with 
the most liquid shares that in a way are already trading at full speed, i.e. there is natural 
equilibrium between the demand and supply. Nevertheless, as the spreads go down, this 
equilibrium could, at least in theory, move to a new level.
The data division into smaller sub-samples is very limited as the sample size is relatively 
small to begin with. I however, believe that the bipartition of the samples based on these three 
aspects is sufficient enough to answer to the research problem from various aspects. In table 2 
below, I present the overlap of the selected sub-samples.
Table 2
Sample Overlap
The percentage figure shows how many of the same shares occur in two different samples. Categories are Spread 
change, pre-event Liquidity and improvement in Trading volumes.
Spread Liquidity Trading
Spread 100% 71.43% 51.85%
Liquidity 71.43% 100% 57.41 %
Trading 51.85% 57.41 % 100%
Table 2 shows us that the selected samples do not overlap very heavily in any of the 
combinations. Most overlapping is, not surprisingly, with the Liquidity improvement and 
Spread decline groups where the percentage is 71.43%. However, table 2 also shows us that 
the largest decline in spreads do not necessarily lead to the largest increase in trading. Neither 
the large decline in spreads nor the pre-event illiquidity correlate very much with the sample 
of the shares that experienced the largest increase in their trading volumes. Therefore, I find it
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justifiable to use the selected samples in order to be able to answer the research questions in 
broad terms.
In the rest of my paper I will concentrate on market reaction and concrete evidence of 
improved liquidity and intensified market efficiency. In the next section I introduce my 
hypotheses more closely and go through the methods I will be using. After that, I will present 
the empirical evidence based on the models I have built for this study. In the Final chapter I 
go through what we have learned and discuss issues arising from my findings.
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4. HYPOTHESES AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
In this chapter I explain the methods I am going to use. My main hypothesis is that the 
liquidity providing system improves market quality and thus increases trading. I also predict 
that investors value this improvement. My hypotheses are as follows:
1. The emergence of Liquidity Providers will lead to a decline in the observed 
spreads.
2. These lowered spreads will promote liquidity and thus increase trading volumes.
3. The improved liquidity, caused by lowered spreads, will enhance market 
efficiency.
4. The improvement in liquidity and market efficiency is valued by investors.
To test my hypotheses I will conduct several tests concerning the issues at hand. The tests I 
have chosen are all widely used in academic literature. In the following subsections I 
introduce the methodology.
The natural starting point for studying the effects of liquidity providing is to study whether 
the liquidity has improved. To test this, I look into trading volumes and market depth. Any 
other possible market reactions should be a result of improved liquidity. In addition, as 1 
presented in Section 3.3, the improved liquidity is one basis for data sampling. Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns are calculated next to capture any abnormal price rise due to Liquidity 
Providers. Then I will look into the market quality.
To test the statistical significance of my results, I will conduct common t-tests for volumes 
and spreads. It should however be noted that a t-tests’ ability to create statistically satisfying 
results with small samples is regarded to be inferior to Wilcoxon’s signed rank test. 
Therefore, I also present the Wilcoxon z-values for paired samples throughout this paper.
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4.1. Liquidity
To study if there is a rise in liquidity I have employed two different models. The theory 
behind the models is that other things being equal, the trading volume or trading frequency of 
a given security is an increasing function of its liquidity (see Mendelson, 1982, 1985; Amihud 
and Mendelson, 1986). Thus, an increase in trading volume of a share after the imputation of 
a new system reflects an increase in its liquidity.
First, I will use a descriptive Excess Volumes-method to graphically show the change in the 
past average daily monetarily adjusted volumes. The results can and will be tested for 
statistical significance and then, I study whether there is a difference in the market depths 
before and after.
4.1.1. Excess Volumes
One of the main targets of Liquidity providing is to guarantee the possibility of trading for 
any given share at any given time. A Liquidity Provider guarantees that there are both bid and 
ask quotes on the market most of the trading time. Therefore, an ex-post increase in trading 
volumes is a very clear indicator of improved liquidity.
The Excess Volumes-model is quite similar to the C4/?-model to the extent that it is based on 
the ex-ante - ’normal’ situation. By making this normality assumption it is fairly easy to study 
any deviation from it. The Excess Volumes - method that I use is based on the assumption that 
the average daily volume across the sample before the event is one. In other words, average 
daily euro volumes before the event day across the samples are normalized with the average 
euro volume in the pre-event window. The same pre-event average is used after the event 
also. If there are no changes in the trading volumes; the post-event Excess Volumes should be 
close to one. My hypothesis is that when spreads decline, the market’s frictions decline, 
which in turn makes the shares more desirable and thus liquid. There should thus be a clear 
jump in the excess volumes at the event date and the trading volumes should settle to a new 
level.
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I will use euro volumes in this study in order to exclude any share price changes from the 
study. This is based on the assumption that there is a fixed amount of money in the market 
and it is allocated between all shares on the market. Any increase in the euro amount trading 
on a particular share represents an increase in its demand. Absolute units would tell us 
nothing about the actual demand as it can at any given time deviate heavily depending on the 
prevailing share price. Accordingly, I find it appropriate to study the absolute trading volumes 
instead of market relative volumes8. After all, my main interest is whether the trading 
volumes of the underlying shares improved. Another justification is the fact that the shares 
engaging in the liquidity providing system are well dispersed over about three years and there 
is little possibility, if any, that the results could stem from aggregate time trend changes in the 
market places.
The Excess To/wmes-method is an efficient way to graphically show any change in the trading 
pattern. For the graph I have to first calculate the daily excess volumes across the samples. 
The pre-event average daily euro volume is calculated for each share and for the whole 
samples using a 65 day window before the event from T -74 to T -10. Consequently, the 
relation between the daily euro volume and the ex-ante average is calculated for trade dates T 






where ExEurVolt is the daily excess euro trading volume for the sample at time t, (EurVol)jt is 
euro volume of stock j at time t, Average (EurVol) before is the 65 day sample daily euro 
volume average for the period from T -74 to T -10 before the event. The summation is across 
the sample shares at time t. Any post-event deviation from one will mean exception from pre­
event average trading volume level. In this study I will show results in a 10 day Excess 
Volumes moving average graph to show the difference between ex-ante and ex-post volumes.
8 Amihud and Mendelson (1997) use relative trading volumes (i.e. percentage of the market place’s total trading 
volumes) to study the change in the liquidity. Another commonly used method is to use the turnover ratio which 
is the proportion of the total number of shares on the market that are traded at any given time.
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To statistically test whether the trading volumes have increased, I conduct a common t-test 
and Wilcoxon signed rank test. The t-tests are done on the ex-ante and ex-post daily average 
excessive volumes. The proper t-test for the sample averages will be a two sample t-test 
assuming unequal variances. Wilcoxon z-values are calculated for the paired sample of shares 
to study whether the shares have experienced an increase in trading volumes on an individual 
basis.
4.1.2. Liquidity Ratio
The liquidity ratio (LR), also called Amivest measure of liquidity, measures the trading 
volume associated with a unit change in the stock price. The measure represents the euro 
volume required to move a share price 1% up or down, that is what euro volume of trading is 
necessary to effect a 1% price change. A higher LR implies greater market liquidity or depth. 
The liquidity ratio is defined as
(2)
where, Vjt and Rjt are, respectively the volume and return on stock j on day t, and the 
summation is over the days in the estimation period (see Cooper et al., 1985; Khan and Baker, 
1993). Estimation period in use is from T -49 to T -5 for the period before and from T +5 to T 
+49 for the period after the event. The relative change in the liquidity ratio (LR) for stock j is 
defined by
DLRj log ( LRj after / LRj, before)» (3)
where the subscripts are as defined above. To see whether there has been any significant 
change in the LR a t-test for paired sample and a Wilcoxon signed rank test is employed.
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4.2. Efficiency
One of the targets of the LP-system is to improve efficiency. In theory, any improvement 
closer to the efficient market hypothesis should improve market efficiency. Smaller spreads at 
least give investors a possibility to react quicker, with lower costs, and with more accuracy to 
any new information in the market.
Amihud and Mendelson (1991b) (see also Amihud et al., 1997) introduce the Relative Return 
Dispersion, based on the variance of returns across securities, as a descriptive measure of the 
efficiency of a trading mechanism. The RRD should decrease as market frictions decline. The 
RRD-model prediction is based on the premise that a market model should become a more 
descriptive model of an exchange’s securities when the exchange’s trading costs and other 
frictions are lower. Accordingly, the market model is estimated in the pre and post event to 
find out if the estimations are better in the latter.
With very illiquid shares there may be several trading days between the days that these shares 
actually are part of trading. The share price development between two consecutive trades can 
be of large size due to the elapsed time period between the trades. In addition, large spreads 
have a tendency to make market model error terms larger. It is easy to understand that due to 
this, the market model error terms, which in this case are the base of RRD, are large and any 
increase in trading and decrease in spreads would have a lowering effect on these error terms.
With the most liquid shares the effect may not of large significance or extent. These shares are 
already trading on a daily basis and their spreads are at a lower level than the Liquidity 
Providers minimum requirements are. Accordingly, I am expecting to observe a smaller, if 
any, change in RRDs with liquid shares.
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The RRD-model statistic is calculated for time-t as follows:
where RRD, is relative return dispersion for the entire sample (sub-samples) of securities at 
time t; e2jt is the squared market model (5) residual for security j at time t; and n is the number 
of securities at sample time t. The summation is across the sample shares for time t. RRDt’s 
are estimated for a 90 day period before and after the event date for all samples. I will use a 
19-day window around the event day to exclude any abnormal behavior from the sample.
To statistically show the difference between the pre-event and post-event situation, I will use 
t-tests assuming unequal variances. I present the average sample RRDs for all the samples as 
well as the change in them. I will also present Wilcoxon signed rank z-values for paired 
sample based on the change in individual shares’ RRDs for the pre and post event periods.
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4.3. C um ulative Abnormal Returns
A very interesting and important issue to study is whether there are positive returns related to 
shares in the sample around the LP implementation date. If there is any value in improved 
liquidity, the imputation of the LP systems would affect the share price and result in abnormal 
returns. To study any abnormal gain in share prices around the event day I have employed a 
CAR-model around the event date to see if there are any permanent price changes.
The method frequently used to investigate abnormal performance when there is incomplete 
prior information about the event when it occurs is the ‘cumulative average residual’ or 
‘cumulative abnormal returns’ (CAR) technique introduced by Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll 
(1969). The methodology is very simple. It is based on the common market model and has 
been widely used (see e.g. Amihud et al., 1997 or Brown and Warner, 1980). The model 
should reveal any price changes around the event day. My hypothesis is that liquidity is one 
component of the share price and thus investors should put some value on its improvement.
The rationale behind the model is that the market model would on average predict the share 
price correctly based on the overall market movement. Accordingly, in the normal 
environment without any external shocks, daily returns would be evenly distributed around 
the market model predictions. Observation deviations, error terms, from the model’s 
prediction are assumed to be normally distributed with a mean of zero. In other words, the 
summation of subsequent daily returns over time would result in zero and there would not be 
any abnormal returns. If there are abnormal returns then this summation is expected to be 
positive and increasing over time until the share price reaches its new level (or vice versa). 
After the new price level has been reached, the summation of error terms over time would 
once again be zero.
I estimate the market model regressions
Rjt = Oj + ßjRMi + Ejt, (5)
where RJ( is the logarithmic return on stock j on day t and RM, is the daily logarithmic return 
on the market related to the share in hand (that is logarithmic daily total return on the chosen
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market indices), aj and ßj are the constants and the coefficients, respectively, and Sjt are the 
residuals. The market model is estimated over days T - 95 to T - 6.
I then calculate the abnormal returns for the sample
ARjt = Rjt - ( ctj + ßjRMt), (6)
for each share j and each day t in the event window (days T - 5 through T + 40) where the 
parameters a and ß have been estimated by the market model (5) and Rjt is the actual 









where CARSampie is sample average CAR for the days T - 5 to T + 40. ARj is the abnormal 
return for share j on day t and summation is performed over the whole sample at time t. N is 
number of sample shares. The daily development of CARsampie from T - 5 to T + 40 is 
presented in graphs for all sub-samples. The clear evidence of increased prices would be a rise 
in CARsampie after the event day, T = 0. The graphs will cover an event window from T -5 to T 
+40.
The abnormal returns will then be tested for significance. For this I will conduct a common t- 
test with the null-hypothesis that the event-window abnormal returns are zero. If the nuul- 




In the second chapter I introduced some of the most obvious handicaps for the overall market 
stemming from bad liquidity and large spreads. The reasons varied from holding costs to 
asymmetric information. In any case, I found it logically coherent to claim that the Liquidity 
Providers can affect these downsides, at least in the worst case scenario. By lowering spreads 
and guaranteeing that trades can take place every day, they at least make the shares more 
desirable for the investors.
In the literature review chapter I introduced various theories surrounding liquidity. The 
general tendency was that market microstructure improvements would have a positive effect 
on both trading and the share values of the underlying shares. The results in those studies are 
very much the same as I am expecting to obtain. However, where Bacidore (1996) and Ahn at 
al. (1995) failed to find an increase in trading volumes when the spreads decline and 
accordingly theoretically liquidity improved, I am waiting to get clear signs of increased 
volumes at least in the group of the most illiquid shares.
In this chapter I will go through the findings regarding the LP-system. The starting point is 
liquidity. The ultimate justification for the presence of the liquidity provides’ is the promise 
they will enhance market efficiency. As I have presented earlier in this study, the method of 
doing so is to guarantee that during most of the normal trading time, there exists a fairly 
priced bid-ask spread. The bid-ask spread has a maximum range it has to lie on in order to 
reduce the indirect costs stemming from spreads. I start by creating a link between diminished 
spreads and improved liquidity in trading.
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5.1. Liquidity’
The main goal of a liquidity providing system is to improve liquidity and efficiency. That is 
done by guaranteeing the quotes on the market on most of the trading time. In addition, the 
bid and ask quotes are required to be in a certain range from each others so that the costs 
caused by the spreads would decline. In chapter 3.2 I have already shown that the spreads 
have declined. In this chapter I will study whether those declined spreads have lead to the 
desired effect, i.e. an increase in trading?
To test the change in liquidity I will employ two different kinds of models. The first one, 
called Excess Returns - model, is a graphical way to show if there is a change in the average 
trading volumes. Data behind the graphs can be tested for statistical significance. The second 
model measures market depth using liquidity ratios. It measures what amount of trading has 
to take place in order for it to have an effect on the share price.
According to my hypothesis there should be clear signs of increased trading activity as well as 
deepened market depth. Even if some of the prior studies at least partly have failed to find 
results of increased trading volumes and market depth, the prior similar studies have reported 
solid clear evidence. Trading frequencies and the spreads have been at very undesirable levels 
with the most shares under the investigation. The new system does not only decrease their 
spreads but also enables the trading.
5.1.1. Excess Volumes
An excess volumes graph is a way to show any movements in average daily euro volumes. 
The method is based on the average daily pre-event trading volume across the sample shares. 
The pre-event daily trading volumes are normalized with the average daily pre-event trading 
volume so that in the graph they are around one. After the event there should be a jump in the 
graph if the trading volumes have changed. In addition, the trading volumes should keep their 
new level to show a permanent change. I will present the 10-day moving excess trading 
volume average graphs to make the graphs more clear instead of scatter graph..
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Figure За
Excess Volumes Graph - Based on Spread Improvement
The graph shows the 1 О-day moving trading volume average excess volumes from the event window -30 to +40. 
Excess volumes are calculated as the ratio of daily euro volume and 65 day average volume per euro (days -74 to 
-10). Graph value over one indicates that the daily average volume across the sample is more than average 
volume before the imputation of the LP system. The line in the picture is a 10-day moving average
Excess Volumes 
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Table 3a
Excess Trading Volumes Results - Based on Spread Improvement
The table presents average excess trading volumes in euros before and after the event. Average volume before is 
calculated from 65 days period starting from T-74 and ending to -10. After period average is calculated also form 
65 days period starting from T+10 and ending to T+74. A two sample t-test assuming unequal variances is 
conducted to daily sample averages before and after the event. Wilcoxon z-values are calculated for the paired 
sample of shares before and after.
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* Significant at 5% level.
** Significant at 1% level.
*** Significant at 0.1% level
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Figure За above presents the Excess Volumes graph for three spread change based sub­
samples.
The spread changes seem to influence liquidity. The picture shows a clear increase in the 
trading volumes in all samples. The all shares graph (solid line) clearly rises to a new level 
after the emergence of Liquidity Providers. In the graph it seems that the new level for the 
whole sample would be around 4 indicating 300% increase in trading volumes! As can be 
seen in the graph, the average trading volume graphs remain at about the level of one until a 
couple of days before the event, just as it should, as the pre-event trading volumes are divided 
with their average.
In table 3a above shows the statistics for these three samples. The results are very convincing. 
The table presents the 65-days pre- and post-event Excess Volumes averages. All shares’ 
trading volumes double just before the event and continue rising rapidly. 91 of all 109 shares, 
i.e. 84.26%, experienced improvement in their trading volumes. The post-event 65-days 
average excess volume is around 4.96 indicating increase of 396%. T-statistic for that rise is 
8.0514 and corresponding Wilcoxon z-value for paired sample increases is 7.4636 meaning 
that the results are statistically significant at the 0.001% level.
The 10-day moving average line for the shares that have experienced the largest spread 
reduction clearly reaches a higher level than the other two sub-samples. The rate of rise is also 
much higher around the event in the case of a large spread improvement. This supports the 
theory that claims the spread to be a major determinant of liquidity. However, after day 30, 
the difference between the groups experiencing small spread versus large spread changes is 
not very large.
The test results for those other two sub-samples are convincing as well. As can be seen in the 
graph, the two groups that are separated based on spread improvement have experienced 
increases in trading volumes. The large spread improvement group has reached a 7.14633 
times higher level and the least improved shares 2.81661 times higher level than before the 
event than before the LP-system was introduced to the market. 81.48% of the small spread 
change group’s share experienced increases in trading volumes and the number was even 
larger for the small spread change group, i.e. 87.04%. T-statistics for these two samples are 
7.4281 for small spread change group and 6.3011 for large spread change group, which
55
indicates statistically highly significance for both sub-samples. In addition, the Wilcoxon z- 
value for paired sample of increase in trading volumes are significant for both groups being 
5.6311 and 4.8992 for large and small spread change groups respectively.
A quite interesting fact is that the trading volumes start to rise before the event day. It is often 
reported in academic literature that the cumulative abnormal returns start to rise already 
before the event day because of information leakage. That is in the case that there are agents 
on the market that speculate on the effects of the event.
Here, the all shares and the largest spread change group’s graphs start to rise already before 
the event. That may be a sign of information leakage indeed but there may also be another 
possible explanation. It may be the case that (at least partly) the reason for the pre-event 
increase could be the transactions made by Liquidity Providers. After all they have to carry at 
least some kind of inventory in order to meet the market requirements. Anand et al. (2005) 
also found that trading activity increased following the contracting, suggesting that Liquidity 
Providers were actively engaged in trading with public customers. Similarly, there is a jump 
in the graph around day 20. It is very hard to come up with an explanation for this but it could 
be an indicator of changes in ownership structure. To find out if that is the case a study with 
more accurate agent data should be made in order to reveal the activities of Liquidity 
Providers.
Nevertheless, the ‘normal’ trading reaches a new level and the test results are statistically 
significant. Furthermore, there is an observable link between the magnitude of the spread 
decline and the increase in trading volumes even if the percentage number of gainers is larger 
in the large spread change group than in the other. The results are very convincing regardless 
of the fact that they are not market adjusted. In addition, but not surprisingly, the results are 
very similar to those earlier studies on the effects of Liquidity Providers.
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Figure 3b
Excess Volumes Graph - Based on Pre-Event Liquidity
The graph shows 10-day moving trading volume average excess volumes from the event window -30 to +40. 
Excess volumes are calculated as the ratio of daily euro volume and 65 day average volume per euro (days -74 to 
-10). Graph value over one indicates that the daily average volume across the sample is more than average 
volume before the imputation of the LP system. The line in the picture is a 10-day moving average.
Table 3b
Excess Trading Volumes Results - Based on Pre-Event Liquidity
Average excess trading volumes in euros before and after the event are presented in the table. Average volume 
before is calculated from 65 days period starting from T-74 and ending to -10. After period average is calculated 
also form 65 days period starting from T+10 and ending to T+74. A two sample t-test assuming unequal 
variances is conducted to daily sample averages before and after the event. Wilcoxon z-values are calculated for 
the paired sample of shares before and after.
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* Significant at 5% level.
** Significant at 1% level.
*** Significant at 0.1% level
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Figure 3b and table 3b above present the results for the two sub-samples based on pre-event 
liquidity measured as trading volumes. The results are along the lines with what was 
anticipated. Figure 3b clearly shows that there is a rise in trading levels in both the pre-event 
illiquid and liquid shares sub-samples. Here again the trading volumes start to rise a couple of 
days before the event day and seem to be settling in their new level around the day T+30.
As anticipated, the rise in trading volumes is larger with the most illiquid shares. In that sub­
sample the post-event 65-days excess volume is on average around 7.47 indicating roughly a 
650% rise in average trading volumes. From the sample of 54 shares, 85.19%, i.e. 46 shares, 
experienced increases in their trading volumes. The results are statistically highly significant 
in both measurements. T-statistic in this sub-sample is 6.6287 and Wilcoxon z-value for the 
paired sample for improvement is 5.4094.
With the most liquid shares, the rise in trading volumes is a bit more modest but nevertheless 
obvious. Even in this sub-sample 83.33% (45 out of 54) of shares were trading on average at a 
2.49375 times higher volume than before the event. T-statistics for this improvement is 
8.1233 and the Wilcoxon z-value is 5.1855. Both are statistically highly significant.
The results for these two groups are close to the ones with spread decline based sampling. The 
originally illiquid shares seem to gain as much as the shares whose spreads declined the most 
in the terms of excessive volumes. Accordingly, originally most liquid shares and the shares 
whose spreads declined the least show a much more modest change in their trading volumes. 
That is not surprising due to the fact that the small spread change and liquid shares samples 
overlap about 78%. However, the division based on pre-event liquidity achieves more 
deviation between the two groups indicating that the magnitude of spread decline may not be 
the dominant player in the liquidity improvement. This is impossible to determine without 
further studies. One thing is for sure. The spreads have role in liquidity.
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Figure Зс
Excess Volumes Graph - Based on Improvement in Trading Volumes
The graph shows 10-day moving trading volume average excess volumes from the event window -40 to +40. 
Excess volumes are calculated as the ratio of daily euro volume and 65 day average volume per euro (days -74 to 
-10). Graph value over one indicates that the daily average volume across the sample is more than average 
volume before the imputation of the LP system. The line in the picture is a 10-day moving average
Table 3c
Excess Trading Volumes Results - Based on Improvement in Trading Volumes
In the table are presented average excessive trading volumes in euros before and after the event. Average volume 
before is calculated from 65 days period starting from T-74 and ending to -10. After period average is calculated 
also form 65 days period starting from T+10 and ending to T+74. A two sample t-test assuming unequal 
variances is conducted to daily sample averages before and after the event. Wilcoxon z-values are calculated for 
the paired sample of shares before and after.








Excessive Volume 1.00000 4.95657 3.95657 1.00000 1.24849 0.24849 1.00000 8.71445 7.71445
St.Dev 0.57820 1.99319 1.41499 0.45955 0.34827 -0.11128 0.37368 8.01117 7.63750
t-stat 8.05137 *** 3.47445 *** 7.75521 ***
Number of positive 91 (84.26%) 37 (68.52%) 54 (100%)
Wilcoxon z 7.4636 *** 2.2688 * 6.3931 ***
* Significant at 5% level.
** Significant at 1% level.
*** Significant at 0.1% level
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Figure 3c contains the 10-day excess volume moving average graph based on the 
improvement in trading and table 3c contains the statistics. Figure 3c clearly shows that the 
least benefited half of the sample has been able to only slightly improve their liquidity in 
terms of trading volume. Nevertheless, the increase seems to be statistically significant.
The most gained half of the shares’ post-event 65-days average excess volume is at 8.71445 
time higher level than before the event. Naturally in this part of the sample there are only 
shares that experienced increase in trading volumes. Without saying, the results for this 
sample are statistically important. The other part of the sample experienced only around 
24.85% rise in their trading volumes. Nevertheless it is statistically highly significant even if 
the statistics here are weaker than with any other sub-sample before.
The group with the least improvement in the trading volumes has increased in trading 
volumes only slightly. In the figure the trading pattern seems to jump a little before the event 
date. That would furthermore convince me of the fact that all the jumps before the event day 
in the graphs would be the trades made by Liquidity Providers themselves acquiring 
necessary inventory for the future trades. Of course it cannot be proven here, but if the case is 
so it would influence the normal market behavior around the event date. For instance, the 
following tests for the abnormal returns may be a result from the market makers acquisitions.
In this section I have tried to link the decline in spreads to an improvement in trading and thus 
in liquidity. First, I presented the results where I found a connection between the spread size 
reduction and the trading volume increase. According to these, it is evident that the spreads 
and the liquidity go hand in hand. Shares that experienced a larger drop in the spread levels 
also experienced a larger rise in their trading volumes. That in turn is convincing proof that 
the presence of Liquidity Providers on the market is justified. At the same time it gives us 
evidence of inefficient markets as the evidence suggests that there can be an external system 
that can boost activity.
Second, I showed that those shares that were originally least liquid gained relatively more 
than their more liquid counterparts. The results with the most liquid shares were close to the 
one with the least spread change. The reason behind that behavior is partly due to the fact that 
the spread change groups and pre-event liquidity based groups overlap by 78%. Nevertheless, 
the improvement is clear in both sub-samples. Therefore, it is fair to say that Liquidity
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Providers in general are capable to increase trading regardless of the liquidity of the share and 
that improvement is larger with originally illiquid share.
I also found out that the increase in trading volumes started commonly already before the 
imputation of the new system. That may be in part due to the fact that in order for the 
Liquidity Providers to be able to guarantee the trades, they have to carry at least a little 
inventory. If so, the jump in the trading graphs before the event day could be as a result of the 
trades made by Liquidity Providers themselves. In addition, there was a jump in the graphs 
around day T+20. The reason could be that there is a change in ownership structure. After all, 
the institutional investors would now be more interested in these shares as they meet the 
requirements that institutional investors set for shares they want to keep in their portfolios.
The characteristic of Liquidity Providers would suggest that Liquidity Providers themselves 
cause trading volume when acting on the market. However, with the data at hand the impact 
of the Liquidity Providers’ trades on the trading volume remains unsolved. Nevertheless, no 
matter who is trading the shares, the results here suggest that the trading volumes have 
increased substantially in all sub-samples.
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5.1.2. Liquidity Ratio
In this chapter I Will look into market depth. Market Depth is the size of an order needed to 
move the market a given amount. If the market is deep, a large order is needed to change the 
price. To measure that I introduced a liquidity ratio, the so-called Amivest measure, in the 
section 3.4.3. The measure tells us how big euro volume of trading needs to be in order to 
cause a 1% movement of the share price either up or down. A higher LR implies improved 
liquidity and thus, larger market depth. I will introduce the results for all three samples staring 
from the ones with spread changes.
My hypothesis is that market depth gets deeper as the shares acquire a Liquidity Provider to 
help their trading. Many aspects support that. The very basics of economics suggest the price 
equilibrium of any given share is where the supply and demand meets. If there is vast 
amounts both demand and supply in the equilibrium no small addition on either side will have 
power to move the equilibrium. Before the existence of Liquidity Providers the trading of 
many of the sample shares was really infrequent and small. Therefore, I would suggest that 
the ability to influence market price would have been greater before the trading volumes went 
up. As we have seen so far the trading volumes really have increased especially with the most 
illiquid shares.
Table 4a
Relative Changes in Liquidity Ratios - Based on Spread Improvement.
In the table are shown relative average changes in the liquidity ratios (formulas 2 and 3 above) between before 
and after the event. Ratios are calculated from -49 T to -5 T for before sample and from +5 T to +49 T for after 
sample and DLRs are derived from them. Positive DLR implies greater market liquidity or depth. T-test and 
Wilcoxon signed rank test for DLRs is conducted with the null hypothesis that the DLR is zero.
All Small Spread Change Large Spread Change





















* Significant at 5% level.
** Significant at 1% level.
*** Significant at 0.1% level
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In the table 4a above are the results for the sample shares divided into sub-samples based on 
their spread decline. Starting from the whole sample the DLR9 has increased in 88 out of 108 
of the sample shares. Average DLR for the whole sample is 0.7174 implicating that all shares 
now on average require higher euro volume to move share prices up or down 1% than it was 
the case before the event. The t-statistic for that sample is 5.3550 being statistically significant 
at 0.1% level. The Wilcoxon signed rank z-value for the shares with the positive DLR is 
highly significant being 6.72027.
Not surprisingly, the sample with the shares that experienced the largest decline in the spreads 
have also in here taken the most out of the Liquidity Providers’ services. As I showed already 
above these shares experienced also a large increase trading volumes. In that sample the 
average DLR is 0.78191. That figure is not terribly higher than it was above with all shares. 
85.19% of the shares in this class have increased in the terms of liquidity ratio. T-statistic for 
DLR is 5.1656 and Wilcoxon z-value for the DLRs not being zero 4.7033.
The small spread change sub-sample shows results of deepened market depth as well. To be 
more precise the results do not alter a great deal from the ones that we have seen so far in the 
other two samples. The average DLR in this sample is 0.65293 while 77.78% of all shares 
have positive DLR. The t-statistic for the sample average DLR is 5.6902 and the Wilcoxon z- 
value 4.7636.
To sum up, the size of spread improvement in spreads alone does not play a crucial role in 
deepening market depth in this study. The results across the sub-samples are really close to 
each others. Even so, there can been seen some relations between the spreads and the market 
depth but I would suspect that the common factor is more in the increased trading volumes 
that does not correlate with spread movements 100%. In the table 4b below are the statistics 
for the pre-event liquidity based sub-samples.
9 DLR is the relative change in the liquidity ratio (LR)
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Table 4b
Relative Changes in Liquidity Ratios - Based on Pre-Event Liquidity
In the table are shown relative average changes in the liquidity ratios (formulas 2 and 3 above) between before 
and after the event. Ratios are calculated from -49 T to -5 T for before sample and from +5 T to +49 T for after 
sample and DLRs are derived from them. Positive DLR implies greater market liquidity or depth. T-test and 
Wilcoxon signed rank test for DLRs is conducted with the null hypothesis that the DLR is zero.
All 1 jquid Illiquid
N = 108 N = 54 N = 54
Average DLR 0.71742 0.54612 0.88872
St.Dcv 0.98450 0.88386 1.05629
Number of positive 88 (81.48%) 41 (75.93%) 47 (87.04%)
t-stat 5.3550 *» 4.5405 **• 6.1827 ***
Wilcoxon z 6.7027 *** 4.1264 *** 5.2113 ***
* Significant at 5% level. 
** Significant at 1% level. 
*** Significant at 0.1% level
From the table 4b we can straight away see that the results are as anticipated. Initially more 
liquid shares have gained less than the initially less liquid ones. The average DLR for liquid 
sub-sample shares is 0.5461 with 75.93% of them having it positive. T-statistic for the sample 
is 4.5405 and Wilcoxon z-value for the DLRs is 4.1264. Results are statistically satisfying.
The illiquid share sub-sample shares have deepened their market depth the most. Average 
DLR in this sub-sample is as high as 0.8887 with 87.04% of the sample shares having it 
positive. Naturally both t-statistics and Wilcoxon z-value are highly significant in this sub­
sample. T-statistic is 6.1827 and Wilcoxon z-value is 5.2113, both being statistically 
significant at 0.1% level.
The results suggest that even though the large spread change group and illiquid shares sub­
sample experienced quite similar decline in their spreads the pre-event illiquid group shares 
still improved their market depth more. Once again it seems that the spreads can not alone 
explain the improvement in the liquidity. There may be more to liquidity as the originally 
illiquid shares were able to take more out of the new system than the group with the most 
improvement in the spreads. The reason behind that is uncovered here. However, the 
improvement in market depth goes hand in hand with improvement in trading volumes and 
that effect in turn explains the difference between the spread decliners and pre-event illiquid 
group. The same applies with the liquid shares and small spread movers. In that case the small
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spread movers has been able to increase their trading more and accordingly their market 
depths has increased more10.
The results above then support the theory of the liquidity. The more change in trading 
volumes and thus liquidity the more improvement in market depths too. That naturally is so 
because of the fact, the increased trading and deepened market depths are indicators of 
improved liquidity. Down below in the 4c are presented the results for the sub-samples based 
on the trading volumes which capture the best the improved liquidity.
Table 4c
Relative Changes in Liquidity Ratios - Based on Improvement in Trading Volumes
In the table are shown relative average changes in the liquidity ratios (formulas 2 and 3 above) between before 
and after the event. Ratios are calculated from -49 T to -5 T for before sample and from +5 T to +49 T for after 
sample and DLRs are derived from them. Positive DLR implies greater market liquidity or depth. T-test and 
Wilcoxon signed rank test for DLRs is conducted with the null hypothesis that the DLR is zero.
All Small Change Large Change
N = 108 N = 54 N = 54
Average DLR 0.71742 0.17831 1.25654
St.Dev 0.98450 0.85876 0.79186
Number of positive 88 (81.48%) 34 (62.96%) 54 (100%)
t-stat 5.3550 *** 1.5258 ' 11.6607 ...
Wilcoxon 2 6.7027 *** 2.2408 * 6.3909 ***
‘ Significant at 10% level 
* Significant at 5% level. 
** Significant at 1% level. 
*** Significant at 0.1% level
The results are as according to my presumption. Above, it is clearly seen that the 
improvement in the liquidity ratios and market depth is the greatest with the shares that had 
largest increase in the terms of trading volume. It is not surprising, as they are measurements 
of the same thing, i.e. liquidity. However, to fully study the market effects I want to test the 
sample from the best and least benefited point of view.
10 In the section 3.3 was presented the overlapping of the samples. Pre-event liquidity based sample 
overlaps more (57.41%) with the samples that is based on trading volume improvement than the 
spread based sample, (51.85%). In section 5.1.1 the improvement in trading was largest with the least 
liquid shares. 85.19% reported positive change in trading on average 6.47 against large spread 
decliners 81.48% and 6.15. Respectively the small spread movers were able increase trading on 
average 1.82 (87.04%) against liquid shares’ 1.50 and 83.33%.
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The results suggest that the market depth of the shares with the least increase in trading would 
have not change at all or have risen only modestly. However, the average DLR across the 
sample is slightly positive, 0.1783 with 62.96 percent of the sample shares having it positive. 
Wilcoxon z-value is 2.2408 indicating evidence of deepened market depth at 5% significance 
level but the t-statistics is only significant at 10% level providing us with little evidence. As 
we remember from the previous chapter, even in this sample the overall trading increased on 
average around 25%. That is sufficient enough to show a weak evidence of deepened market 
depth even in this sub-sample.
In the group where the increase in trading was largest so is the increase in market depth. The 
average DLR for that group is 1.25654, all sample shares having it positive. The t-statistic is 
11.6607 and Wilcoxon z-values is 6.3905 both being statistically highly significant. The 
results are of course in this sampling self-evident.
The evidence presented above supports the theory that the spreads are playing a role in the 
function of liquidity. While some prior studies have failed to show the relations of decreased 
spreads and increased trading volume, I found strong evidence on the relation. It, however, 
must be kept in mind that the situation is not quite the same as in e.g. Pac i dore ( 1996) or Ahn 
et al. (1995). The biggest difference is the quote guarantee as a new feature to the market that 
promotes automatically the liquidity. Moreover, the inventory trades made by Liquidity 
Providers may increase the trading. Nevertheless, by controlling the spreads and guaranteeing 
the quotes the liquidity providing system has clearly succeeded where it suppose to. The all 
shares sample shows as results of increased trading volume and deepened market depth. The 
results are all statistically significant.
The results are in accordance with my own presumptions. In addition, they are close to the 
results of Anand et al. (2005) and other papers on liquidity providing. The originally most 
liquid shares gained relatively less than less liquid ones. The reasoning is very simple to lead 
to diminishing spreads. Originally liquid shares experienced relatively smaller decline in their 
spreads than originally less liquid shares. Accordingly, originally liquid shares experienced 
less improvement in their trading volumes and vice versa.
Some interesting issues arose from the results. Above it was shown that the changes in 
liquidity were larger for the originally illiquid shares than for the shares that experienced the
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largest decline in spreads and neither the largest spread decliners nor the pre-event illiquid 
shares were not ultimately the same shares as the ones that increased the trading the most. 
That would indicate in theory that there may be another factor also that has vitalizing effect 
on trading besides spreads. Obviously many companies that have engaged in liquidity 
providing contract may have done other promotion efforts also in order to make their share 
more attractive to the investors. That in turn may explain the results. But it is possible that the 
guarantee that the trading can take place in the first place has a role here also. As the Liquidity 
Providers guarantee that trades can always take place, it should in theory boost trading 
without the matter of spreads. No trading can take place if the agents, sellers and buyers, are 
not present on the market at the same time. At least in theory, the quote guarantee on the 
market could be one explanation in that matter. It certainly leaves room for further studies.
Nevertheless, I was able to create a link between the spreads and liquidity. The general 
tendency seemed to be that the more improvement in the spreads the more increase in trading 
and the more increase in trading the more increase in the market depth. The results were most 
of the part very convincing and statistically significant. Therefore, in the light of the results I 
would say that the Liquidity Providers have been able to meet the targets they are set to meet. 
Across all the shares the liquidity has improved to the great extent, originally the most illiquid 
shares taking the best out of it.
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5.2. The RRD Model - A Test for Efficiency
In the previous section I presented evidence of improved liquidity. The theory suggests that 
improved liquidity should in turn enable investors to incorporate information to the share 
price more quickly and with greater precision. Therefore, the pricing errors relative to the 
market index should be smaller due to the fact that both faster adjustment to changes in the 
market index and smaller firm-specific errors given the information available from the 
observed prices (see Amihud et Al. 1997).
The Liquidity Providers even further strengthen the signals that can be read on the observed 
prices. As I discussed in the second chapter, the Liquidity Providers should in theory decrease 
the affect of asymmetric information as they have to monitor the companies they guarantee 
very closely. If it was not so, they would not be able to guarantee the required spreads and 
live another day.
To test whether efficiency has improved, I have used the RRD model introduced in Section 
4.2 (above). According to the model, the common one-factor market model (5) residuals 
should be smaller after improvement in the exchange’s trading system.
The results below are very much as anticipated. Most sub-samples experienced a declined in 
the RRDs. The results support the theory that the market conditions would have been 
improved along with the Liquidity Providers. However, there are some differences to the 
presumptions I have made in the course of this paper.
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Table 5a
RRD-Model Results - Based on Spread Improvement
RRDs are calculated from the window surrounding the event from -99 to - 10 and from +10 to +99. A two 
sample t-test assuming unequal variances is conducted for each sub-sample and all shares with the null 
hypothesis that the difference between sample daily average 90 days before and 90 days after is zero. Wilcoxon 
z-values are calculated on the paired sample of sample shares. The difference in Average RRD is presented as a 
percentage decline from the before value.
/VII Small Spread Change Large Spread Change
N = 108 N = 54 N = 54
Before After Difference Before After Difference Before After Difference
Average RRD 0.000894 0.000635 -28.94 % 0.000674 0.000588 -12.80% 0.001168 0.000702 -39.88 %
St.Dev 0.000440 0.000263 -0.000178 0.000342 0.000340 -0.000002 0.000825 0.000456 -0.000369
t-stat -5.1042 *** -1.6973 * -4.6851 ***
Number of negative 77 (71.30%) 34 (62.96%) 43 (79.63%)
Wilcoxon z 4.5241 *** 1.7608 * 4.1975 ***
* Significant at 5% level. 
** Significant at 1% level. 
*** Significant at 0.1% level
Table 5a above presents result for all shares and the shares divided into two sub-samples 
based on the decline in the spreads. The results suggest that the overall market quality has 
improved as anticipated. All shares’ RRD has decreased 28.94% with 71.30% of all shares 
reporting decreased RRD. T-statistic for sample RRD is -5.1042 indicating strong evidence of 
decline. Wilcoxon z-value, 4.5241 for the paired sample, is also significant at 0.1% level. The 
overall market quality with the LP-shares has indeed improved.
The shares with smallest decline in their spreads show weaker evidence of improved market 
quality. The sample average RRD has declined about 12.80% with only 62.96% of them 
having it positive. Both the t-statistic and Wilcoxon z-value are significant at 5% level and the 
test results can be just accepted with weak evidence of improved market quality.
The shares with the largest change in the spreads show the strongest evidence of improved 
market quality. Naturally, the market model becomes more accurate model when the spreads 
decline. In addition, as the spreads are extra costs to the investors I would argue that they are 
frictions that cause a drift further away from the efficient market hypothesis. The RRD in this 
group has declined 39.88%. RRD is positive with 79.63% of shares while both the t-statistic, - 
4.6851 and Wilcoxon z-value, 4.1975, are significant at 0.1% level.
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Table 5b
RRD-Model Results - Based on Pre-Event Liquidity
RRDs are calculated from the window surrounding the event date from -99 to - 10 and from +10 to +99. A two 
sample t-test assuming unequal variances is conducted for each sub-sample and all shares with the null 
hypothesis that the difference between sample daily average 90 days before and 90 days after is zero. Wilcoxon 
z-values are calculated on the paired sample of sample shares. The difference in Average RRD is presented as a 
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* Significant at 5% level. 
** Significant at 1% level. 
*** Significant at 0.1% level
In the table 5b are presented the results for the samples based on the pre-event liquidity. Here 
we can clearly see that the originally liquid shares report larger relative change than the 
illiquid shares does. Both sub-samples, however, report enhanced market efficiency. 74.07% 
of the liquid shares have decline in their RRD and the sample average has diminished about 
39.42%. T-statistic for that sample is -4.5738 and Wilcoxon signed rank z-value is 4.1286 
both being significant at 0.1% level.
The results with the originally illiquid shares are weaker but nevertheless statistically 
significant. The sample average has declined about 22.15% with 68.52% of all shares having 
the RRDs diminished. T-statistic, -2.9488 and Wilcoxon z at are significant at 5% level.
The results here are only partly in line with the theory. Illiquid shares’ RRDs before the event 
are on the higher level than the corresponding RRDs of liquid shares. That means that the 
assumption of larger error terms with illiquid shares was justified. In addition, I thought that 
after the event, the market model error terms would decline when shares are traded on more 
frequent basis and make among other things price discovery more accurate. The results above 
are in contradiction with my anticipations. I would have expected that originally illiquid 
shares would have experienced more clear change in their market model error terms. 
However, only 68.52% of them have experienced decline in RRD as the same number with 
the most liquid shares 74.07%.
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The reasons behind that development are hard to come up with. Generally, I would still think 
that most illiquid shares would gain the most of any market improvement. In the table 5c 
below are presented the results for the samples based on the improvement in the liquidity. The 
results are in line with the results above. The shares that show the most improvement with 
their liquidity show the least improvement in the market quality.
Table 5c
RRD-Model Results - Based on Improvement in Trading Volumes
RRDs are calculated from the window surrounding the event from -99 to - 10 and from +10 to +99. A two 
sample t-test assuming unequal variances is conducted for each sub-sample and all shares with the null 
hypothesis that the difference between sample daily average 90 days before and 90 days after is zero. Wilcoxon 
z-values are calculated on the paired sample of sample shares. The difference in Average RRD is presented as a 
percentage decline from the before value.
All Small Change Large Change
Before
N - 108 
After Difference
N = 54 
Before After Difference Before
































* Significant at 5% level. 
** Significant at 1% level. 
*** Significant at 0.1% level
The results for the shares that have experienced increase in their trading volumes the most, 
report only weak evidence of improved market quality if at all. In this case I have to accept 
the null-hypothesis that the sample average RRD has remained on the same level.
Small change group reports strong evidence of improvement in market quality. The sample 
average RRD has declined 51.56%. 83.33% of shares in that sample report decline in their 
RRD. The results are supported by at 0.1% significant level t-statistic of -7.7440 and 
Wilcoxon z-value of 5.0929.
The results suggest that the market efficiency improvement is largest with the originally more 
liquid shares and the shares that experienced the least improvement in their liquidity. That 
really is against what I would have otherwise thought. There are several reasons behind my 
thoughts. Maybe the most prominent is the fact that the originally most liquid shares were 
already subject to frequent trading, had lower spreads, are more closely monitored and
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information is more easily available to anyone. That means that they are in the first place 
closer to the efficient environment and that they in theory had less to gain from this new 
system. On the other hand the least liquid shares before the help of liquidity providers were 
subject to large spreads and infrequent trading. Accordingly their ability to react to the market 
moves was weak. However, the more frequently traded shares seem to be able to take the best 
out of the liquidity providing and even further strengthen their market efficiency.
The results above show the relation between the spreads and RRD-model. The common 
market model is able to project the actual returns more accurately when the spreads decline. 
However, in the case of large improvement in the trading volumes the RRD-model results are 
the weaker the larger the improvement. Explicitly that would mean that improvement in the 
liquidity would improve market efficiency only a little if at all. Whether or not that is the case, 
is a subject for closer studies.
The main point, however is, that the results show us without any doubt that Liquidity 
providing has improved the market efficiency when measured with RRD-model as whole. 
Any further interpretation of the results is quite difficult for the fact that they contradicts with 
the theory quite much. The results here certainly leave room for further studies.
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5.3. Value of Liquidity
So far in this study I have presented evidence that Liquidity Providers have been able to 
increase liquidity and enhance the market efficiency. My hypothesis is that investors put value 
on those improvements. That would be also in accordance to theory I introduced in the 
chapter 2. The theory of liquidity suggests that as the liquidity improves the expected returns 
would decline. Therefore, I expect to see a permanent share prices rise after the event. The 
price rise is expected to be the greater the more improvement in the liquidity.
In the figure 4a below is presented the Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the spread based 
sub-samples and all shares. In the table 6a below are presented the statistics for the abnormal 
returns for the 16 days event window, days 0-15.
The Cumulative Abnormal Returns keep until the d-day at the ground level as they are 
supposed to without any external shocks. The price rise starts just after the event day and 
keeps rising for the first 16 days until they reach their new level and the rise settles. That 
suggests that the price increase would be permanent and that it is caused by the event under 
the investigation. In addition, the fact that the price improvement happens after the event there 
would not be any information leakage before the event or that no one has taken advantage on 
it. In some cases the price rise starts before the event probably due to the fact that some 
people are reacting on the event before they should know about it.
In the picture the both spread based sample lines are quite close to each others. And around 
the whole sample’s line. The cumulative abnormal return for all shares in first 16 days is 
3.4244% indicating substantial increase in the wealth of existing shareholders. The t-statistic 
for that period is 2.0354 providing us evidence at the 5% significance level. The test statistics 
suggest that the abnormal returns for these sub-samples in the 16-days event window would 
be for small spread change group 2.5825% and the large spread change group 4.2663%. Small 
spread change groups t-statistic is not significant even at 10% level and will be rejected. The 
large spread change t-statistic is 2.3288 and significant at 5% level and can just be accepted.
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Figure 4a
Cumulative Abnormal Returns - Based on Spread Improvement
In the picture are presented the Cumulative Abnormal Returns for all shares, 54 shares that experienced largest 
decline in spreads and 54 shares with smallest change in spreads.
Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Based on Spread Improvement
Table 6a
Cumulative Abnormal Returns - Based on Spread Improvement
In the table are presented the statistics for the Daily Abnormal Returns for the Days 0 - 29. T-statistics are for 
the null-hypothesis that the average daily abnormal return is zero in the event-window.
All Small Spread Change Large Spread Change
N = 1728 N = 864 N = 864












CAR Days 0- 15 3.4244 % 2.5825 % 4.2663 %
* Significant at 5% level.
** Significant at 1% level.
*** Significant at 0.1% level
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Figure 4b
Cumulative Abnormal Returns - Based on Pre-Event Liquidity
In the picture are presented the Cumulative Abnormal Returns for all shares, 54 originally most liquid and 54 
originally least liquid shares.
Table 6b
Cumulative Abnormal Returns - Based on Pre-Event Liquidity
In the table are presented the statistics for the Daily Abnormal Returns for the Days 0 - 29. T-statistics are for 
the null-hypothesis that the average daily abnormal return is zero in the event-window.
All Liquid Illiquid
N = 1728 N = 864 N = 864
Average Daily Abnormal Return 0.21402 % 0.01839% 0.40966 %
St.Dev 0.04372 0.02237 0.05760
t-stat 2.0354 * 0.2419 2.0918 *
CAR Days 0 - 15 3.4244 % 0.2943 % 6.5545 %
* Significant at 5% level.
** Significant at 1% level.
*** Significant at 0.1% level
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In the table 6b above, are the statistics for the pre-event liquid and illiquid shares. The 54 
originally most liquid shares seem to have gained nothing while the 54 least liquid shares 
seem to have boomed. The least liquid shares reach rapidly their new level around 6-8% 
higher than prior the event. That is in line with the anticipations. Liquidity of the originally 
most liquid shares increased only slightly and accordingly there are no abnormal returns in 
that group. According to test results we can accept the liquid shares’ null hypothesis that the 
daily abnormal returns are zero. Pre-event illiquid shares instead show a total of 6.5545% rise 
in the share prices during the 16 day event window. The t-statistic for the illiquid shares is 
2.0918, which is significant at 5% level.
The results suggest that the pre-event liquid shares have not gained any market value 
indicating that improvement in the liquidity has not been great enough to increase share 
prices. Other way around there is no evidence of liquidity premium in the prices of the 
originally most liquid shares. The result is not surprising, as these shares were already before 
the event very liquid and easily tradable. Therefore, improvements that Liquidity Providers 
have brought to them are quite small and investors have not been discounting their prices for 
illiquidity. As we remember these shares’ trading volumes increased only slightly whereas the 
situation with the originally most illiquid shares was totally different. Accordingly their CAR- 
graph rises significantly and the price rise is statistically significant. However, neither of these 
groups correlates very greatly with the sampling based on trading volume increase. Only 
about 57% of the pre-event illiquid shares belong to the most trading increased group.
Next, I will look into the sampling that in theory should provide us with the strongest 
evidence of liquidity premium. In the figure 4c below are the Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
graphs for the samples based on the increase in pre-event trading volumes. It presents the 
graphs for the shares whose liquidity have increased the most and the ones whose liquidity 
has increased the least. It is clearly shown in the picture that the shares that experienced the 
largest change in their trading volumes also experienced the largest price rise. 54 shares with 
largest trading volumes improvement seem to have gained around 8% whereas shares with the 
least change in their trading volumes have not gained at all. The results support the theory that 
investors would put value on improved liquidity.
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Figure 4c
Cumulative Abnormal Returns - Based on Improvement in Trading Volumes
In the picture are presented the Cumulative Abnormal Returns for and all shares, 54 shares that have experienced 
largest improvement in trading volumes and 54 shares with smallest change.
Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Based on Improvement in Trading Volumes
Table 6c
Cumulative Abnormal Returns - Based on Improvement in Trading Volumes
In the table are presented the statistics for the Daily Abnormal Returns for the Days 0 - 29. T-statistics are for 
the null-hypothesis that the average daily abnormal return is zero in the event-window.
All Small Change Large Change
N = 1728 N = 864 N = 864












CAR Days 0- 15 3.4244 % -0.8741 % 7.7229 %
* Significant at 5% level.
** Significant at 1% level.
*** Significant at 0.1% level
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In the table 6c above are the statistics for the daily abnormal returns for the trading volume 
change based sub-samples. Not surprisingly we have to accept the null-hypothesis that daily 
abnormal returns are zero in the case of the shares that experienced the least improvement in 
their trading volumes. In the figure 4c the sample line seems to be totally unaffected and it 
follows the x-axis on the graph. That naturally is in accordance with the theory as the 
improvement in liquidity is quite modest among those shares. Their trading increased only 
about 24% which clearly is not enough to have positive effect on the prices.
The situation is totally different with the shares whose trading volumes have experienced the 
largest increase. Those shares seem really to have gained a lot. The CAR line for those shares 
climbs within 16 days on the new level. The price rise in the graph is around 8% (7.7229% in 
the 16 days event window) indicating substantial increase in share values. The t-statistic for 
that price rise is 2.4390 being statistically significant at 1% level. That is very much in line 
with the prior papers and the theory of liquidity.
The Liquidity Providers at first hand affect on the spreads. The shares which reported the 
largest improvement in their spreads experienced a price rise whereas the shares whose 
spreads were affected only a little experienced only a modest price rise if any. As we have 
seen the spread decline tend to lead to improved liquidity. However, the relative decline in the 
spreads does not ultimately define the improvement in the liquidity".
To sum up, the results are very much as anticipated and are in line with the theory. The results 
suggest that the investors put value on the improvement in the liquidity. On average the LP- 
shares gained about 3.1% over the 16-days event window. The improvement was the greatest 
in the sample that reports the largest increase in its liquidity also. In addition, the results for 
the pre-event least and most liquid shares sub-samples supports the idea that the most illiquid 
shares are more likely to experience larger abnormal returns as the changes in their liquidity 
are bigger. That provides us with evidence of existence of liquidity premium. Investors 
discount illiquid shares more heavily.
11 Only 51.85 of the shares that experienced the largest decline in the spreads and 71.43% of the least liquid 
shares belong to the group of shares that experienced the largest increase in their trading volumes. Accordingly 
the liquidity improvement was slightly greater in the illiquid shares sub-sample than the large spread change sub­
sample.
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In the previous chapters, I have already tried to explain the characteristics of the liquid shares 
compared to illiquid ones. The most prominent difference between these two samples is the 
trading activity, demand and especially their spreads. With liquid shares there is always 
enough supply and demand so that the bid and ask prices drive closer to each other and the 
trading takes place. That in the other hand enables more accurate price discovery and there is 
no need for liquidity premium in the share prices.
In the case of illiquid shares on the other hand the situation is quite opposite. The low demand 
and supply makes their liquidity weak and the quotes on the market are often quite far away 
from each others. That makes a fair price discovery difficult and investors discount the prices 
due to the difficulties of trading. Liquidity providing brings these illiquid shares so much 
closer to efficient market hypothesis just enabling the trading. Surely, a rational investor puts 
value on that improvement, or other way around, stops discounting the prices so heavily.
Finally, the results here are very close to the ones presented in the Anand et al (2005). They 
also found that the liquid shares gained nothing in terms of abnormal returns. Their liquid 
shares group posted abnormal returns of 6.19% which is in the same region as my results. The 
link is not surprising as I have 50 same shares in my sample.
So what comes to the Liquidity Providers, it seems that they bring enhancements on the 
market that market is willing to valúate. Therefore, from this point’s of view, the presence of 
Liquidity Providers is also justified. The overall market reaction is positive with the shares 
improving in liquidity the most taking the best out of it. The price rises seem to be statistically 
significant all shares and the price rise goes hand in hand with the improvement in liquidity 
providing us with evidence of existence of liquidity premium.
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6. CONCLUSION
In this thesis I have studied the impact of Liquidity Providers on market quality at the 
Helsinki Exchange and Stockholmsbörsen. I find this paper important in at least two ways. 
The major issue at hand is if the liquidity providing system has succeeded where it is 
supposed to: has it improved the market quality and increased volume? If so, do the investors 
put value on this hypothesized market quality improvement? According to the efficient 
market hypothesis the price discovery should be efficient and accurate despite of any external 
systems. For the companies contracting Liquidity Providers or planning to do so the results of 
this study may provide very interesting and important information. The main hypothesis in 
this paper was that the implementation of LP system in these two Nordic exchanges will 
improve market quality.
The results are very convincing. Spreads of the participating shares have decreased in 102 out 
of 108 shares about 78% indicating substantial improvement. However, in this study I had 
only access to daily closing spreads and therefore, the results have to be contemplated with 
care. Nevertheless, as the closing spreads have declined and given the characteristics of the 
liquidity providing system I am willing to argue that the spreads have declined in the other 
times too.
The main target of the Liquidity Providers is to promote liquidity. Accordingly, I was able to 
find evidence of increased trading volumes in vast amounts. Not surprisingly, the 
improvements in trading volumes and market depths were the greatest among the originally 
least liquid shares and the shares that experienced the most improvement in their spreads. All 
participating shares reported an average increase of about 396% in trading volumes. The 
number of shares that experienced an increase in trading volumes was 91, i.e. 84.26% of all 
shares. In addition, I found evidence of deepened market depths in all my sub-samples. The 
change in liquidity ratio was positive in 81.48% or 88 out 108 participating shares. 
Improvements in the liquidity were statistically significant in all sub-samples.
Based on the closing spreads the increase in trading was not entirely attributable to the 
magnitude of the spread decline. Only 51.65% of the shares were the same in the two groups 
based on the increase in trading and decline in the spreads. That would partly suggest that
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there is more to liquidity providing than just the spread effect. In the theory chapter I 
introduced various positive effects that Liquidity Providers may bring to the market in 
accordance to smaller spreads. The most important may be the quote guarantee and the 
diminishing problems of asymmetric information and fair price discovery in that regard.
According to the efficient market hypothesis there should not be any frictions in the market. 
To study whether the liquidity and spreads have an influence on the market efficiency I also 
conducted a test to study the effect of Liquidity Providers on the overall market efficiency. 
The results for all shares suggest that the market efficiency would have increased. 66.67% or 
72 out of all 108 participating shares reported a decrease in their market model error terms. 
The results, however, claimed that the more liquidity and trading increased, the less of an 
impact it had on the RRD-model test results indicating that the shares that enjoyed the most 
improvement in other aspects took the worst out in this respect. The results are confusing as 
the theory would suggest that the market efficiency improvements would be greatest in the 
case of the most improvement in liquidity.
A very interesting question for both financial economists and investors is whether investments 
in improving the market microstructure have positive value. Ceteris paribus, improved 
liquidity is expected to increase securities values because rational investors discount securities 
more heavily in the presence of higher trading costs. Accordingly, I tested for any abnormal 
price behavior as well.
I found evidence of increased prices indicating that the investors really do put value on 
liquidity. The results in that part support the Liquidity Premium-theory. The price rise for all 
shares was about 3.4% and statistically significant. The magnitude of the spread decline did 
not seem to play a dominant role in the price rise. The price rise was the greatest among the 
shares that reported also the greatest improvement in their trading volumes supporting the 
theory that investors discount the illiquid shares more heavily. Accordingly, the price rise was 
neither significant nor positive for the pre-event liquid shares.
To sum up, the Liquidity Providers contribute greatly to the market. They succeed where they 
are supposed to. The results suggest that shares that are subject infrequent trading and large 
spreads can improve their market conditions by making an agreement with a Liquidity 
Provider. Small firms are generally the ones subject to liquidity problems and are therefore
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the ones that can gain the most out of the liquidity providing system. It should be in any 
firm’s interest that its share is correctly priced on the market. The reasons vary from cost of 
capital to takeover shelter and management problems. However, the larger companies with 
smaller liquidity problems can also enjoy the fruits of the liquidity providing system.
Many aspects of the liquidity providing system are not answered here. One very interesting 
question relates to the effect of the quote guarantee on the market. As the Liquidity Providers 
guarantee that trades can always take place, it should in theory add value as it reduces the risk. 
No trading can take place if the agents, sellers and buyers, are not present on the market at the 
same time. Therefore, part of the improvements in the liquidity must be related to the enabling 
effect. Another very interesting issue closely related to the one above and the Amihud et al. 
(1997) and Cooper et al. (1985) is the share price behavior in the bear and bull market or even 
in some crisis. Finally, at least in theory and in e.g. Dimson (1979), the participating shares’ 
betas may change when the shares undertakes liquidity improving methods. Whether or not 




When the return on an asset or security is in excess of the expected rate of return
Capital Asset Pricing Model - CAPM
A model that describes the relationship between risk and expected return and that is 
used in the pricing of risky securities.
r¡ = rf + Д (rM -rf), where rf = risk free rate
Д = beta of a security 
rM = expected market return
The general idea behind CAPM is that investors need to be compensated in two ways: 
time value of money and risk. The time value of money is represented by the risk-free 
{rf) rate in the formula and compensates the investors for placing money in any
investment over a period of time. The other half of the formula represents risk and 
calculates the amount of compensation the investor needs for taking on additional risk. 
This is calculated by taking a risk measure ( Д ) that compares the returns of the asset
to the market over a period of time and to the market premium (rM -rf).
CAR - Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Summation of consecutive abnormal returns over predetermined time period. Based on 
financial theory CAR is zero if no unexpected external shocks are induced into 
market. Any deviation of zero means that the security has under or over performed.
Common Market Model
Model is used to estimate the share returns based on market movements.
Explicitly, Rj, = a, + ßjRMt + ej where Rj, = estimated security return at time t
ßj = market risk or security beta 
RMt = market index return at time t
= error term
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Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH)
An investment theory that states that it is impossible to "beat the market" because 
stock market efficiency causes existing share prices to always incorporate and reflect 
all relevant information. According to the EMH, this means that stocks always trade at 
their fair value on stock exchanges, and thus it is impossible for investors to either 
purchase undervalued stocks or sell stocks for inflated prices. Thus, the crux of the 
EMH is that it should be impossible to outperform the overall market through expert 
stock selection or market timing, and that the only way an investor can possibly obtain 
higher returns is by purchasing riskier investments.
Liquidity
1. The degree to which an asset or security can be bought or sold in the market 
without affecting the asset's price. Liquidity is characterized by a high level of 
trading activity.
2. The ability to convert an asset to cash quickly, simply; ease of trade.
Liquidity Premium
An asset's liquidity premium is a form of compensation for investors who tolerate the 
extra risk stemming from liquidity risk - compared to that of a risk-free asset - in a 
given investment.
Liquidity Provider
Liquidity provider guarantees that there are both bid and ask side quotes on the market 
for the guaranteed security. Moreover the spread must be within 4% calculated from 
the bid price.
Liquidity Providing
The system where Liquidity Providers help normal trading by guaranteeing quotes on 
the market within certain limits (see Liquidity Provider).
Liquidity Ratio
Also known as Amivest measure. The measure tells us how big the euro volume of 
trading needs to be in order to cause a 1% movement of the share price either up or 
down. A higher LR implies improved liquidity and thus, larger market depth.
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Liquidity Risk
The liquidity risk is stemming from the lack of marketability of an investment that 




Market depth is the size of an order needed to move the market a given amount. If the 
market is deep, a large order is needed to change the price. Contrast with liquidity, the 




Market risk is a risk inherent to the entire market or entire market segment. It is 
also known as "un-diversifiable risk" or "systematic risk."
Relative Residual Dispersion (RRD)
RRD-model measures the market efficiency based on the presumption that the market 
model becomes a better estimator of share price performance when there is less 
friction on the market. Implicitly that means that market model error terms will 
decline as the market efficiency improves.
Risk Premium
The return in excess of the risk-free rate of return that an investment is expected to 
yield. An asset's risk premium is a form of compensation for investors who tolerate the 
extra risk - compared to that of a risk-free asset - in a given investment.
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Specialist
Specialist is a member of an exchange who acts as a market maker to facilitate 
the trading of a given stock. The specialist holds an inventory of the share, posts the 
bid and ask prices, manages limit orders and executes trades. Specialists are also 
responsible for managing large movements by trading out of their own inventory. If 
there is a large shift in demand on the buy or sell side, the specialist will step in and 
sell out of their inventory to meet the demand until the gap has been narrowed.
Spread
The difference between the bid and the ask price of a security or asset.
Small Firm Effect
A theory that suggests that smaller firms, or companies with a small market 
capitalization, will outperform larger companies. This market anomaly is a factor used 
to explain superior returns in the Three Factor Model, created by Gene Fama and 
Kenneth French - the three factors being the market return, companies with high book- 
to-market values, and small stock capitalization.
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